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 4 
Introduction 
 
 As the light rose over the horizon for the second time that morning in 1945, the scientists 
at Los Alamos celebrated their achievement as the world entered the nuclear age.1  The United 
States held on to its nuclear secrets in the beginning, but soon the information and technology 
spread to the Soviet Union and beyond.  Nuclear technology became a desirable symbol of 
power around the world and countries went to great lengths to acquire it.  As a former colonial 
hold of Great Britain, Pakistan wanted to cement its status as the most influential Muslim nation 
in the world by acquiring an atomic weapon.  During his administration, President Jimmy Carter 
took on the threat of Pakistani proliferation with vigor.  His efforts did not dissuade Pakistan 
from developing an atomic bomb, but he did warn the entire international community and was 
effective in temporarily slowing Pakistan’s nuclear development program.      
 The proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology became a significant concern of 
President Carter during his final two years in office.  As more countries requested and traded 
nuclear information, the threat of nuclear proliferation grew.2  In order to fully understand the 
complicated diplomatic situation between the United States and Pakistan regarding Pakistani 
inquires into nuclear weapons development, it is crucial to understand previous diplomatic 
interactions between the two countries and the Carter administration’s foreign policy.  An 
investigation of the Pakistan’s competition with India, the Carter administration’s foreign policy, 
Pakistan’s longing for a nuclear weapon, and the impacts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty reveal 
the complicated and potentially dangerous relationships between the United States, Pakistan, and 
other nations of the world. 
                                                
1 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986). 
2 “Atomic Power: The Spread of Nuclear Technology Hold Promise and Peril for Developing 
World,” The Washington Post, December 3, 1978, A1.  
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 Pakistan’s early history had a significant influence on its desire for an atomic weapon, 
especially its relationship with India.  The first chapter details the United States previous foreign 
policy interactions with Pakistan, concentrating on interactions after Pakistan gained 
independence from Great Britain in 1948 to the early years of the Carter administration. 
Understanding the rivalry between Pakistan and India is crucial to understanding one of 
Pakistan’s main motivations towards the development of nuclear weapons.3 Pakistani Prime 
Minister Bhutto, who first began the atomic program, “claimed that before he was deposed 
Pakistan was on the verge of ‘full nuclear capability.’ He pointed out in this context that only the 
Muslim world was without nuclear capability and said Pakistan would share the technology with 
Islamic states.”4  The chapter will also examine Pakistan has experienced political instability 
since its independence in 1948.  The constant shifting of power between the civilian and military 
leadership played a profound role in providing the United States and other countries 
understandable questions about Pakistan’s intentions.   
 The second chapter details Carter’s foreign policy in general, his main foreign policy 
advisors, and how his policies affected Pakistan’s relationship with the United States.  One of the 
two areas covered are Carter’s campaign promises to the American people and the foundation for 
his administration’s foreign policies.  For example, in one instance Carter halted aid to Pakistan 
because of its failure to protect human rights, but then reestablished aid when the United States 
needed Pakistan’s support after the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan.5  The chapter 
introduce Carter’s top two foreign policy advisors, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National 
                                                
3 Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 52. 
4 “U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant” November 1978, National Security Archive 
(hereafter: NSA) http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/index.htm, (accessed 
November 27, 2011). 
5 “U.S. to Renew Aid to Pakistan,” The Washington Post, August 25, 1978, A23. 
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Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.  The two advisors were important in the development of 
United States foreign policy to Pakistan, but problems developed between them that weakened 
Carter’s administration.   The final section of the chapter details Carter’s development of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Pakistan’s reaction to the existing Non-Proliferation Treaty.  
When the original Non-Proliferation Treaty was offered to the international community, 
developing countries interested in acquiring nuclear power considered it racially motivated and 
declined to sign.6  Carter hoped that a new treaty would bring the hold out countries together and 
end the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing.     
 The final chapter evaluates the diplomatic discussions between U.S. officials and other 
countries regarding the development of nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan.  The chapter 
begins with a focus on the discussions between the United States and France regarding France’s 
sale of gas centrifuges to Pakistan and the plan to build a reprocessing plant, which caused 
tensions between the two countries.7  A reprocessing plant would have given Pakistan the 
capacity to produce weapons grade plutonium suitable for an atomic device.   The other intention 
of the chapter is to discuss the anxieties between Islamabad and Washington D.C. regarding the 
Pakistani French contract and suspending Pakistan’s aid.  The final section discusses the 
international pressure that the United States put on its allies to limit Pakistan’s access to atomic 
materials, including informing the International Atomic Energy Agency of the situation.  
 Most information utilized for the thesis is from the National Security Archive, which is 
an archive that compiles released SECRET U.S. documents.  Most of the documents released 
                                                
6  “Non-Proliferation Value of a Comprehensive Test Ban.” July 10, 1978. Memorandum for the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSA, 1, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm  (accessed February 2, 2012).  
7 “French Export of Centrifuges for Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,” September 1978, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/index.htm (accessed November 27, 2011). 
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regarding this period of the Carter administration were released within the past two years and 
cover the time period from August 1978 to January 1979, the critical time period regarding 
Pakistan’s inquires into nuclear material.  Among the documents are correspondences between 
State Department officials, including Secretary of State Vance and Deputy Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher, and American ambassadors from around the world.  Most of the documents 
are telegrams between the Embassies in Paris, London and Islamabad that discuss the current 
situation with Pakistan and the most appropriate diplomatic responses.  
 The Foreign Relations of the United States is another critical source of information that 
expands upon the history of diplomatic relations between the United States and Pakistan.  The 
documents disclose the diplomatic cables from the Truman through the Ford administrations’ 
and are an invaluable source of information regarding diplomatic relations.    For example, 
several of the early documents discuss the disintegration of the British Commonwealth and the 
creation of Pakistan and India.   
 The other documents utilized were newspaper articles that discuss the situation in 
Pakistan and American reaction to the situation.  The Washington Post and The New York Times 
both reported on Pakistan and the U.S. response to the current diplomatic tensions.  Several of 
the articles also discussed the current problems with nuclear proliferation in developing countries 
and concerns that they could not properly maintain a nuclear facility. Newspaper articles also 
shed light on the political climate in Pakistan and the United States in the late 1970s, and the 
international reaction to nuclear issues.  The newspapers also show the growing strength of the 
radical Muslim movement before the takeover of the Embassy in Tehran.  Some of the 
information regarding nuclear issues is still classified; so, newspapers are crucial to setting the 
tone of international relations. 
 8 
 Another source of information regarding the Carter administration will be through the 
review of memoirs from the former president, Vance, and Brzezinski.  Carter served as the 
president from January 20, 1977 to January 20, 1981 during a time of great political upheaval in 
Pakistan.8  In his memoir and published a diary, Carter did not delve deeply into thePakistan 
issue, but he did make a couple of passing comments reflecting on the situation.  He also 
discussed his appointment of Vance and Brzezinski and his relationship with the advisors and 
their respective departments.9  Vance’s Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign 
Policy offers more detail regarding Pakistan-United States relations.10  Brzezinski’s Power and 
Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981 details his term and the 
decisions he made during his own tenure at the White House.11  The only drawback to the 
memoirs is that most of the information provided is limited because of national security issues 
and each author is biased towards their own position.   
 Carter administration’s foreign policy shows the complicated nature that existed between 
established nuclear powers and developing countries wishing to bring their countrymen into the 
nuclear age.  Pakistan’s wish to acquire atomic weapons was not merely to intimidate its 
neighbors, but to bring an atomic weapon into the Muslim world.  The proliferation of nuclear 
weapons caused great concern to the international community and challenged the Carter 
administration’s policies.  Carter did limit Pakistan’s access to nuclear technology and materials. 
                                                
8 “Pakistan’s Crisis,” The Washington Post, February 20, 1979, A14. 
9 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982); and 
Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010). 
10 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1983). 
11 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-
1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1983). 
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However, Pakistan did continue its search for atomic materials and successfully detonated its 
first atomic device in 1998.12   
 In the beginning of his administration, Carter made a variety of promises regarding non-
proliferation and told the American people that he wanted to bring morality back to the White 
House.  However, once in office, Carter faced increasing problems around the world with 
American foreign policy and soon abandoned this practice in favor of a more aggressive 
approach.  His abrupt switch also caused conflict within his own administration and the eventual 
resignation of his secretary of state.  An investigation into his campaign promises shows that the 
idealism spoken connected to a desire within American hearts, but Carter could not present a 
comprehensive policy to the American people. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 41. 
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Chapter 1 – The Foundation for Conflict 
 After years of research, Pakistan proudly set off an atomic bomb in 1998 and became the 
first Muslim nation to join the nuclear community.13  The explosion caused tensions around the 
world and further strained diplomatic relations between Pakistan and its main rival India, which 
had detonated its own atomic device in 1974.14  The original Pakistani effort to build the atomic 
bomb began in the 1950s and reached a fever pitch during the Jimmy Carter administration when 
Pakistan made a deal with France for a reprocessing plant that could create fissionable 
plutonium.1516  Pakistan’s complicated relationship with the Untied States served as a strong 
example of its limited understanding of South Asia’s political and military history, and the 
inability of the United States to dissuade Pakistan from developing the atomic bomb.   
 The people of Hindu and Muslim faiths had previously lived together in peace for 
centuries under the Hindu and British Empires.  At the dawn of the twentieth century, democracy 
movements began to rise throughout the world and the colonies of the British Empire began to 
                                                
13 John Kifner, “That Pakistan Nuclear Expert May Be a Lowly Accountant,” The New York 
Times, July 3, 1998, A6; and Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 41. 
14 “Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” December 18, 1975, Memorandum 
to Holders: Special National Intelligence Estimate, NSA, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc01.pdf, (accessed on December 9, 2011), 8.  
15 Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 217. 
16 To date, India and Pakistan are the only two countries in the atomic era that have participated 
in a hot war against each other while possessing nuclear weapons.  Sagan points out that the 
situation signifies a unique event within atomic history and shows the possibility that a conflict 
between two nuclear powers can happen.  One argument for nuclear weapons is that it limits the 
ability for two atomic powers to fight against each other because of the possibility of mutually 
assured destruction.  India and Pakistan disproved this theory in 1999 when the Kargil War 
began and each country had atomic capabilities that were never used. Scott D. Sagan, Ed., Inside 
Nuclear South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), Loc 64-69. 
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demand their independence.17 When free elections came to British India, it required a census of 
all the people living within the colony and their religious affiliations.  The Muslims were aware 
of their minority status within the territory, but it was ever more evident after the census that put 
to paper the inequality between the two groups.18  As the Indians moved towards majority rule, 
some members of the Muslim population became increasingly paranoid that they would be 
marginalized within the structure of the new independent India.  Nationalism increased through 
movements around the colonial territory and pro-independence Muslims created a council in 
order to develop a political presence in the government.19  The beginning of this differentiation 
between groups allowed for divisions to grow between the Muslims and the Hindu.  Once a 
united group of people living peacefully under a single leadership, the peoples of India became 
increasingly divided along religious lines and desirous of separate countries.20 
 The establishment of a distinctly Muslim Congress Party in Indian in 1916, laid the 
foundation for the creation or two separate counting India and Pakistan.21 Muslims came together 
under this banner to contact the powerful Indian/Hindu Congress and originally they wanted to 
work within India.  However, it soon became evident that they needed their own country.  T.V. 
                                                
17 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years 1953-1956: Mandate for Change (New York: 
Double Day, 1963), 495. 
18 “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State,” The British Embassy to the 
Department of State, February 20, 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter: 
FRUS), Volume III, The British Commonwealth, 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1947v03/reference/frus.frus1947v03.i0006.pdf   
(accessed on February 12, 2012), 144-145. 
19 T.V. Paul, The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 6. 
20 Pakistan’s name was created by a group at Cambridge University as an acronym for specific 
territories in Pakistan.  PAKSTAN was a code for the various regions that would be used to 
create the country.  Indian Muslim leader Jinnah also insisted that India should be called 
Hindustan, rather than India.  His reasoning was that India represented the two countries together 
and not separated.  Hindustan never became a reality.  “The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the 
Secretary of State,” 161. 
21 Paul, The India-Pakistan Conflict, 7. 
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Paul writes, "in March 1940, at its meeting in Lahore, the (Muslim) League proclaimed as its 
goal the creation of Pakistan as a separate homeland for Indian Muslims and the Congress-
League schism widened even further."22  Such an arrangement meant not only national 
separation, but also a political identity free from British control. The British and Indians rejected 
this course, heightening tensions with the Muslim population.23 
 After the Second World War, Great Britain decided to dissolve its foreign colonies and 
partition British India.  However, the original colony lines were a single territory that included 
Muslim and Hindu believers under a single political leadership. According to Historian Robert 
McMahon, “The urbane barrister’s dogged insistence that Muslim rights could not be guaranteed 
in a predominately Hindu India had been instrumental in forcing the Indian Congress Party 
hierarchy and Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last British viceroy, to accept with great reluctance a 
partitioned subcontinent.”24  Muslim leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah argued that a Hindu 
government would not treat its Muslim subjects fairly and persuaded British viceroy Lord 
Mountbatten that the Muslim population should be given its own country.25  In accordance with 
Muslim wishes, Lord Mountbatten drafted new borders and formed West and East Pakistan, as 
well as the new territorial boundaries of India on August 15, 1947.26   Unfortunately, the 
boundary lines made little sense because it divided Pakistan’s eastern and western portions, 
located on either side of India, a thousand miles apart (see map 1).  The division of the territories 
was also not confirmed by the 500 princely states of India, which meant that there were still 
                                                
22 Ibid., 7. 
23 Ibid., 6-7. 
24 Robert McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994), 2. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Paul, The India-Pakistan Conflict an Enduring Rivalry, 7. 
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several disputes over the lines of India and Pakistan.27  The decision to dissolve the colonial 
territories of British India caused confusion and laid the foundation for the problems between 
India and Pakistan over the coming decades.  
 Map 1 – Southwest Asia28 
 Governing East Pakistan was troublesome because of communication difficulties.29  
McMahon explains, “Pakistan faced an equally daunting set of structural and political 
challenges, most of which stemmed from the unusual circumstances surrounding its creation.  
Essentially, the Muslim League’s insistence on an independent state for India’s Muslims led to a 
country carved out of the northwestern and northeastern sections of British India, areas with no 
appreciable industrial infrastructure.”30   The other significant problem was that the partition did 
not determine who had the right to claim Kashmir, a territory to the northeast of Pakistan with a 
                                                
27 David W. Lesch, 1979: The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East  (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2001), 107; 39; and Paul, The India-Pakistan Conflict an Enduring Rivalry, 7. 
28 Map of India, East and West Pakistan, http://chishtian.110mb.com/pakistan/pakistan.html 
(accessed March 22, 2012). 
29 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 67.   
30 Ibid. 
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Hindu leader but a mostly Muslim population.31  Tensions between India and Pakistan began to 
intensify as each country sought Kashmir in order to help secure its own borders.32  Pakistan 
truly believed that it was incomplete without the inclusion of Kashmir, since it was a mostly 
Muslim country.33 
 The conflict was rooted in the development of nationalist movements in the Indian 
subcontinent.  The main Hindu party wanted to create a government with a secular leadership, 
and a liberal democracy, but the Muslims worried that this would eventually develop into a 
Hindu government.  The British supported the creation of a Muslim delegation that had limited 
electoral power.34  According to the Muslim leader Jinnah, the Muslims could not accept a 
British Raj being replaced with a Hindu Raj.  The United States Charge of Affairs in India 
George Merrell explained that Jinnah believed “the difference in culture, religion, and way of life 
between the Muslims and Hindus precludes any possibility of a compromise.  He asked why a 
hundred million Muslims should become a minority in a Hindu dominated government."35  
Jinnah went on to state that if any Muslim did not join the independence movement, they would 
be considered traitors of Islam.36  
 When Pakistan gained independence from Great Britain in 1947, it did so in an 
environment of high tensions with India, and the two countries entered a conflict within a year.37  
                                                
31 Ibid., 3. 
32 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War (New York: 
I.B. Tauris, 2003), 70-72. 
33 Paul, The India-Pakistan Conflict an Enduring Rivalry, 9. 
34 Ibid., 6. 
35 “The Charge in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State,” February 11, 1947, FRUS 1947, 
Volume III, The British Commonwealth, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1947v03&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=161, (accessed 
on February 16, 2012), 141-142. 
36 Ibid.  
37 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 2-3. 
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There is no singular event that caused feelings of animosities between the two religious groups.  
However, violence has sporadically erupted and Hindus have attacked Muslims and Muslims 
have attacked Hindus through history. McMahon notes, "Sadly, independence and partition also 
brought in their wake a human tragedy of grotesque proportions.  Deep-seated religious and 
communal tensions and fears, exacerbated by the irresponsible rhetoric of demagogic politicians 
and the arbitrariness of the boundary lines drawn by the British, led to an orgy of bloodletting, 
especially in the Punjab.”38  Great Britain’s inadequate and rushed creation of the two countries 
showed a profound lack of substantive understanding of the history of South Asia, and led to the 
first conflict over Kashmir and Pakistan’s constant feeling of inadequacy.  
 The U.S. reaction to the creation of Pakistan and its conflict with Kashmir were decidedly 
mixed.  Before Great Britain determined that there would be two separate states of Hindus and 
Muslims, the United States was aware of several discussions about whether or not Pakistan 
would be part of India.  While not directly influencing the situation, the United States became 
increasingly concerned that the unstable situation might lead to violence similar to what 
happened during China’s Communist revolution.39  When the conflict later developed in 
Kashmir, the United States wished for a settlement quickly as U.S. officials knew that the 
situation could extend into a full-scale war.40  At this point the United States did not have a 
vested interest in either country since its concern was in war-ravaged Europe.41   
                                                
38 Ibid., 2-3.   
39 “Elevation of the Status of Diplomatic Missions, the Change in India (Merrell to Secretary of 
State), New Delhi, January 4, 1947, FRUS 1947, Volume III, The British Commonwealth, 137, 
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS1947v03.p0155&id=FRUS.FRUS1947v03&isize=M 
(accessed on January 12, 2012). 
40 “India-Pakistan Dispute over Kashmir,” The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 
December 2, 1947, 182-183, Ibid., http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
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 The conflict over Kashmir seemed slight in comparison with the rest of the world’s 
problems, but its impact reverberated throughout Pakistan’s history and profoundly affected 
diplomatic relations with the United States and India.42 Great Britain’s creation of India and 
Pakistan did not include ceding Kashmir since the Maharajah, or leader of the region could not 
decide which country that he wanted to align himself.  As a Hindu leader with a mostly Muslim 
population, Pakistan seemed the obvious choice; however, the Maharajah’s indecision seemed to 
mean that he would move towards India.43  The disagreement over Kashmir worried American 
leadership and had a profound impact on future Pakistan, Indian, and U.S. relations.44 
 President Harry Truman inherited several international problems in the aftermath of the 
Second World War and the disintegration of Britain’s colonial empire confounded the 
international situation.  The partition of Pakistan and India did not come as a shock to the 
administration and Truman sent a brief congratulatory note to both countries in celebration of 
their independence.45  Truman wrote, “On this auspicious day which marks the emergence 
among the family of nations of the new Dominion of Pakistan, I extend on behalf of the 
American people sincere best wishes to you, and through you, to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali 
                                                                                                                                                       
idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1947v03&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=182 (accessed 
on January 12, 2012. 
41 Melvyn Leffler, Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and 
the Cold War (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1993), 1. 
42 Robert Trumbull, “Pakistan Worried by Kashmir Split,” New York Times, November 19, 1948, 
4; and Paul, The India-Pakistan Conflict an Enduring Rivalry, 5. 
43 A.M. Rosenthal, “India and Pakistan Accept Mediation By 3 On All Issues,” New York Times, 
January 20, 1948, 1. Mr. Mohammad Ibrahim believes that it was unlawful Indian occupation 
and an invalid accession of a Hindu ruler. 
44 “Elevation of the Status of Diplomatic Missions, the Change in India (Merrell to Secretary of 
State), 137. 
45 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 3. 
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Khan and the people of Pakistan.”46  Another press release stated that the United States would 
immediately set up an embassy in Karachi, Pakistan and would appoint Charles W. Lewis as the 
first ambassador.47 When it came to developing foreign relations, the United States first leaned 
toward India as its primary country of interest, since India had more natural resources.48  The 
United States recognized Muslim political and economic aspirations, "but that atmosphere for 
creating necessary safeguards can never be achieved unless the concept of union itself is 
generally accepted by principal parties."49 However, after the Kashmir dispute dragged on and 
India seemed to treat the Soviet Union and China equally with Western powers, the United States 
became increasingly frustrated with India, and moved closer to Pakistan.50 India also angered the 
United States when they began to give Truman unsolicited advice on America’s war in Korea.51  
The increasing friction between India and Truman’s administration caused frustrations and 
concerns over the future of South Asia. 
 In order to combat the possible loss of Kashmir, a group of ten thousand tribesmen from 
Pakistan invaded the north country in order to force the Maharajah to pick Pakistan as its 
                                                
46 “Good Wishes Extended to the New Dominions of India and Pakistan,” August 14, 1947, U.S. 
Office of Official Communications July 6 – December 28, 1947, Volume XVII, Numbers 418-
443, 396, http://archive.org/stream/departmentofstat1747unit#page/396/mode/2up (accessed on 
March 1, 2012).  
47 Ibid., 396. 
48 India was the only colony of Great Britain’s that ever produced any revenue for the country. 
49 “Interest of the United States in the Emergence of the Dominions of India and Pakistan,” The 
Charge in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State,” January 4, 1947, FRUS 1974, Volume III, 
British Commonwealth, 136, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1947v03&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=136 (accessed 
on January 12, 2012). 
50 Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 
1984), 204. 
51 Ibid., 268. 
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country.52  When the Muslim tribesmen invaded, the Maharajah’s army lowered its arms and 
joined their Muslim brothers.  Pakistan’s military supported the involvement of the tribesmen 
until military commanders received reports from the front lines of looting and rape.53  In a 
desperate attempt to regain control over the situation, the Pakistani military tried to reassert itself 
over the tribesmen.54  Pakistan’s efforts were for naught when the Maharajah ceded the territory 
to India and the Indian army defeated the Pakistani tribesmen.  Although the conflict was never 
considered a war, Pakistan lost the territory of Kashmir to India and thus a considerable amount 
of power in the region.  The loss also encouraged a massive military build up in Pakistan and 
compromised any future attempt at democracy because the military felt that its control over the 
decisions of Pakistan was critical.55 
 The Pakistani military has always been a powerful presence within the country and any 
civilian leader faced significant problems controlling the military apparatus. As a former colony 
of the British Empire, Pakistan maintained a strong military structure even after the transfer of 
power in 1947. Nawaz explains, "the Pakistan Army, the largely Muslim rump of the British 
Indian Army too was saddled at birth with this paradoxical identity: the symbols of Islam but the 
substance of a colonial force, quite distant from the body politic of the fledgling state.” 56  
History in Pakistan has shown that civilian power will arise for a period of time, but the military 
                                                
52 Robert Trumbull, “Hindu-Muslim Conflict May Bring War in India: The Religious Struggle is 
Basic in Kashmir and Hyderabad Disputes,” New York Times, September 12, 1948, E4. 
53 Robert Trumbull, “Kashmir Tests Future of India and Pakistan: If War Comes, Moslem 
Dominion Will Be at Disadvantage in Resources, New York Times, January 11, 1948, E4. 
54 Robert Trumbull, “Tribesmen Waging Holy War On India: Moslem Warriors Make Cause 
With Pakistan – Declare They Will Never Leave Kashmir,” New York Times, November 23, 
1948, 19. 
55 Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 73. 
56 Ibid., xxvii. 
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will stage a coup d’état at some point in order to gain control over the country again.57 
Understanding the dominate role of the military in Pakistan’s early history is crucial to 
understanding its development of the atomic bomb and Pakistan’s relationship with the United 
States.58 
 During the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Pakistan became 
increasingly close to the United States and an active participant in the Cold War.  Pakistan 
allowed the Central Intelligence Agency to fly U2 planes on spy missions over the Soviet Union 
from bases in its territory.59  CIA officials were looking for “atomic energy installations along 
the Trans-Siberian Railway and a large downrange radar array that was a terminal site for missile 
firings from Kapustin Yar.”60 Conversations between the two countries allowed for the 
cementing of the relationship and led to the use of Pakistani land to support American 
intelligence interests in the Soviet Union.61    In September 8, 1954, Eisenhower worked to create 
the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty, more commonly known as the Manila Pact, 
which included Pakistan, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the United States.  
The purpose of the pact was protecting against possible Communist aggression in the region.  In 
the event of an attack on one country, the others recognized it would endanger the peace and 
safety of other pact countries.62   
                                                
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., xxvii. 
59 “Memorandum of a Conversation: Call by Pakistan Foreign Minister Qadir on the Secretary: 
The U-2 Incident and Soviet Pressures on Pakistan,” June 2, 1960, FRUS 1960, Volume XV, 
Documents South and Southeast Asia, 812, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS195860v15.p0844&id=FRUS.FRUS195860v15&isize=M&q
1=Eisenhower&q2=U-2&q3=pakistan, (accessed on March 21, 2012). 
60 Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1986), 147. 
61 Ibid., 145. 
62 Eisenhower, The White House, 374. 
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 Early in his presidency, Eisenhower sent Vice-President Richard Nixon on a tour around 
South Asia in order to assure allies that the United States was concerned about their needs.63  
Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower was conscientious of the need to keep relations between 
India, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan balanced, and he would often schedule tours that would 
visit all three countries in order to keep the equilibrium.  Eisenhower explains, “it would be 
almost unthinkable for an American President to make a courtesy call on India without including 
Pakistan in his itinerary.  Both nations were our friends each looked to the United States for 
private and public investment, and each, because of their mutual distrust heightened by 
differences over Kashmir, was watchful of every acquisition by the other of military supplies - or 
any other relative advantage.”64  As a president, Eisenhower made sure that the relationship 
between Pakistan and the United States remained similar with its neighboring Muslim countries.  
His balanced relationship with Pakistan was probably one of the most stable periods in the 
relations between Pakistan and the United States. 
 The Kashmir conflict flared again in 1965 as Pakistan renewed its claim to the territory.  
President Lyndon Johnson reflected in his memoirs that the conflict “raised grave doubts about 
military assistance as well as economic aid” that the United States had given to Pakistan.65  The 
other large problem facing the United States was the lack of a grain surplus.  Previously, the 
United States had the ability to send economic aid in the way of grain to countries in need, but 
since the amount of grain produced in the United States had decreased since the 1940s, Congress 
looked at foreign aid with critical eyes.66  The lack of support from the international community 
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increased the tensions in Washington D.C. regarding supportive aid to Pakistan.  The Kashmir 
conflict of 1965 also worried the United States and the Johnson administration because Pakistan 
was using U.S. weapons in the conflict.67  
 One large disruption in Pakistani relations with the United States happened during 
military talks in 1965 and eventually resulted in massive anti-American demonstrations in the 
Asian nation.68  Before the collapse of the United States and Pakistan negotiations, there were 
steady trilateral talks that occurred between India, Pakistan, and the United States regarding 
weapon deals.69 During the Kennedy Administration, Pakistan became increasingly frustrated 
with the United States when it made an economic and military aid deal with India.  H.W. Brands 
explains, “After Kennedy initiated military aid to India, the Pakistanis didn’t have to bother 
equating bread and bullets, since India now received both from Washington,  (So did Pakistan, 
but far less bread and, before long, fewer bullets too).”70  The Johnson administration attempted 
to provide equal aid to Pakistan and India. However, information later leaked that the United 
States and India had reached a secret agreement, which angered the Pakistanis. The United States 
determined that India would receive $10 million of credit for military weaponry in 1965 and 
promised of $50 million more in the next fiscal year.  Pakistani reaction to the pact was swift, 
explosive, and emotional, and anti-American demonstrations were common. Pakistan leader 
Ayub Khan stated that, “Americans do not hesitate to let down their friends.”71    What the 
Pakistanis chose to ignore was that the conflict began with Pakistani soldiers entering the 
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Kashmir disguised as mujahedeen.  Knowing this, the Untied States felt this was an aggressive 
action that did not fall under the provisions of SEATO.72   
 The United States admitted several faults in the relationships between the two countries 
before the war began.73  Some of the diplomatic blunders committed by the United States 
included the cancellation of a trip to Washington D.C. Khan, and finally, Pakistan was frustrated 
that the United States did not come to its defense when India committed aggressive actions in 
1965.74  A previous deal between the United States and Pakistan stated that any military deal 
with India would be discussed with the South Asian country so Pakistan believed it had been 
betrayed by the United States.  Evidence shows that relations between the two countries became 
considerably strained because the United States perpetuated Pakistani beliefs that the U.S. 
government did not support Pakistan or a Muslim government. 
 The United States further angered Pakistan when it demanded that the Pakistani’s not use 
U.S. weaponry in the civil war with East Pakistan and India in 1971.  The weaponry included 
tanks, rifles, airplanes, and other war material.75  India did receive some of her weaponry from 
the United States, but some of her military materials also came from the Soviet Union and other 
countries; so, the U.S. restrictions on weapons use did not affect the country much.76  The United 
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States seemingly biased position against Pakistan was detrimental in the war of 1965 and later 
civil war, and played a key role in Pakistan’s belief that the United States did not support her 
Muslim allies.77 
 Pakistan’s largest crisis was the civil war that began in 1971 between East and West 
Pakistan, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.  The civil war proved to be disruptive to 
the country in several ways and began with East Pakistan’s quest for greater autonomy and the 
growing divisiveness between the Western Pakistan’s Punjabis and East Pakistan’s Benglis.78  A 
slow reaction to a cyclone that killed over two hundred thousand East Pakistanis also played a 
crucial role in the belief that the West Pakistani government was ineffective and unsupportive of 
the East.79   
 An election in 1970 was the water shed moment when Western and Eastern Pakistan 
relations began to break down.  The election resulted in a loss for the Western Pakistani 
government in East Pakistan in favor of the Bengalis.  Current Pakistan leader Mohammad 
Yahya decided to reject those election results.80  The contention soon resulted in conflict as West 
Pakistani forces moved in “with stunning brutality” to crush the rebellion.81 Steve Weissman and 
Herbert Krosney reports, “They had burned Bengali villages, raped Bengali women, killed and 
mutilated unarmed Bengali men.”82 The Western Pakistan forces also began a cleansing process 
of arresting intellectuals, students, spiritual leaders, and separatist leaders, including Sheik 
Mujibur. The government also outlawed the Awami League, which had just won the first free 
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election in the territory and held its leaders for execution.83  One million people became 
casualties and ten million refugees from East Pakistan sought refuge in India.   
 East Pakistan’s quest for liberation drew support from India.  In December 1971, Western 
Pakistani forces launched an air attack against India and turned the civil war into a full-scale 
conflict with its neighbor.84  Pakistan lost this war with India as well which further perpetuated 
its feeling of inferiority to its South Asia neighbor.   The United States was less than pleased 
with the action, especially when Pakistan called upon America to honor the Manila Pact, even 
though Pakistan was the aggressor when they invaded Kashmir.85 
 The Nixon administration had perhaps the closest relationship to Pakistan, and it played a 
crucial role in the United States relationship with China.  At the time, Pakistan was the only 
country in the world that was allied with both China and the United States.86  Nixon sent 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on a mission through Pakistan to China in order to reestablish 
diplomatic relations and make preparations for President Nixon’s historic visit to Peking.87  In 
order to fly to China and begin the process of reconciliation, Kissinger feigned digestive distress 
and with the knowledge of a small amount of American and Pakistani officials, flew to China.88    
Nixon recalls, “On October 25 (1972) President Yahya Khan of Pakistan came to see (Nixon), 
and I used the occasion to establish the ‘Yahya channel.’  We had discussed the idea in general 
terms when I saw him on my visit to Pakistan in July 1969.  Now I told him that we had decided 
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to try to normalize our relationship with China, and I asked for his help as an intermediary.”89 
 During the civil war in Pakistan, India had called upon the Soviet Union to support its 
intervention and to humiliate Pakistan over the loss of Bangladesh.90   Nixon also ordered that 
diplomats side with Pakistan over India in order to avoid the forced dismantlement of West 
Pakistan and “to demonstrate to China that we supported our strategic partners in times of 
crisis.”91  The civil war in Pakistan occurred during the period of reconciliation between the 
United States and China, and the Nixon administration wanted to demonstrate that the United 
States would support its allies during a crisis period.   
 The U.S. reconnection with China also played a crucial role in the war between India and 
Pakistan during the Pakistani Civil War.  After the Sino-American relationship was reestablished 
between 1973-1978, the Soviet Union determined that it needed to reestablish its position as the 
dominant Communist power in the world; so, it offered military aid to India.  In order to limit 
possible Chinese involvement in the war, the Soviet Union moved troops to the Chinese border 
to prevent them from aiding the Pakistanis.92  According to President Nixon, the United States 
took the position as a supporter of Pakistan in order to discourage “Indian aggression and Soviet 
adventurism.”93  But as the conflict wore on it became increasingly evident that West Pakistan 
would lose its Eastern half and Nixon recommended to Yayha Khan that West Pakistan move its 
forces out of the East and in order to protect it from Indian aggression.94  The United States had 
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discovered that India was planning an invasion of West Pakistan, a worst-case scenario for the 
United States considering all the potential casualties.95 
 West Pakistan’s civil war with East Pakistan garnered international attention and caused 
further tension between Pakistan and India.  In a review of the conflict, the Pakistani military 
determined that the West’s defeat was based mostly on its slow reaction to the developing crisis 
and its inability to effectively communicate with its forces in East Pakistan.96 After the war, 
Bangladesh considered itself a client state of India and the two continue to have a strong 
relationship.97 When it came to negotiating the deal with India and Bangladesh, Pakistan was at a 
distinct disadvantage and the new Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto waited to finalize 
the treaty because he did not want to incur domestic disfavor by dealing with the enemy.98 After 
losing Bangladesh, the army took the defeat harshly and continued to increase its size.99   
 When Bhutto came to the United Nations Security Council in order to discuss the current 
situation with East and West Pakistan, he stated that he wanted to mend relations with the United 
States.  Special Assistant to Bhutto, Rafi Raza, explains, "He placated the United States by 
expressing sorrow for 'strained relations' in the past: 'I am prepared to do everything in my power 
to repair those relations in Asia for the United States and in my country where...I speak in my 
right as the authentic voice of the people...The time will come.  We cannot forget it.'"100  
Bhutto’s recognition of the importance of United States and Pakistan relations shows the value of 
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U.S. support in the civil war. 
 Towards the end of the war, Pakistan attempted to acquire more weapons from the United 
States.  However, Nixon did not have the ability to provide the weapons Pakistan requested 
because of previous embargo on foreign military sales was still in effect. Nixon attempted to 
circumvent this by telling CIA officials to arrange for Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to supply 
Pakistan with the weapons.101  Despite his efforts, the request was denied and Pakistan quickly 
agreed to a cease-fire.  President Nixon did attempt to help the Pakistan’s against the foreign aid 
laws of the United States, but the Pakistani governments did not readily recognize his clandestine 
approaches.102 
 Bhutto came to power as a national hero and a popular opposition leader against the 
previous government after the civil war in 1971, but his heavy-handed approach to leadership 
and his handling of the election in 1976 severely affected the length of his tenure.103  The best 
description of Bhutto is that he was “a charismatic, brilliant, flamboyant, but deeply flawed 
politician.”104  Henry Kissinger also described Bhutto as “a man of extraordinary abilities whose 
ruthlessness was matched by his brilliance.”105  Kissinger goes on to discuss how Bhutto’s 
destroyed his own authority by calling for a popular election before manipulating the result.106 
 Bhutto intensified Pakistan’s efforts to gain atomic power to counter India’s 
advancements in nuclear technology.  But, the main reason why Pakistan wanted the atomic 
bomb was because she wanted to enter into the prestigious nuclear club.  The ability for a 
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country to advance into a nuclear power meant that it had emerged from a Third World status.107  
Bhutto’s former press secretary Khalid Hasan said, "He wanted the bomb, you know, because he 
wanted Pakistan to walk tall. He knew that proliferation will come, and that more countries will 
become nuclear, and that there's nothing that can stop it.  So, if everybody's going to have a 
bomb in the basement, he said, 'Okay, if we have the capability, let's do it.'"108     
 In order to have effective diplomacy in South Asia, the United States had to maintain 
relationships with both Pakistan and India without offending either country. India’s problem with 
U.S. policy did not rest only on the selling of weapons to Pakistan, but India’s belief that 
Pakistan would use any acquired weapons for aggressive actions.109  According to the U.S. 
Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, “American officials know full well why Pakistan wants 
these (nuclear weapons)…Pakistan has openly said its arms build-up is aimed against India.”110 
Regardless of beliefs to the contrary, the competitive nature of India and Pakistan has caused 
constant tension between the two countries and if either acquired military weapons or a military 
contract with a foreign country, the other one would make a formal complaint in the international 
community.111  Some of the weapons the United States considered selling to the Pakistani’s in 
1970 included 6 replacement F-104 fighter-interceptors, 300 armored personnel carriers, and 4 
anti-submarine patrol aircraft.  Other weapons options included 7 B-57 bombers and 100 M-
48.112  
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The Indian government specifically warned about a possible backlash against the U.S. 
government if word of the diplomatic exchanges became public knowledge.113  In order to voice 
their grievances, the Indians even publicized their criticisms of the United States in order to 
cause an over reaction within their own media.114  According to William Spengler, the Country 
Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan, “on October 8, 1970, the Indians issued a press statement 
announcing their protest and indicating that they were not satisfied with U.S. explanations for the 
sale. The statement alleged that our decision was against the interest of peace in South Asia. It 
said "the resumption of inflow of arms" to Pakistan, which has committed aggression against 
India three times, is of grave concern; Pakistan is armed only against India.”115  Every action of 
the United States towards Pakistan was interpreted by India as a possible aggressive action 
unless it was favorable towards India’s viewpoint. 
 India’s concern over the military developments in Pakistan spilled into Indian and U.S. 
relations and began to negatively affect American diplomacy with India.   In one particularly 
tense occasion, Indira Gandhi told the U.S. news show, “Meet the Press,” that the sale of 
weapons to Pakistan would harden India’s attitude towards the United States.116  The Indian 
press in particular seized upon this negative situation regarding the selling of U.S. weapons to 
Pakistan and exploited it at home.117 Other diplomatic failures like the accidental non-appearance 
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of an ambassador at the airport to greet Mrs. Gandhi and the failure of President Jimmy Carter to 
accept Mrs. Gandhi’s dinner invitation served as examples of the tense Indo/U.S. relations.118 
The actions by the U.S. government were not deliberate, but the Indian press seized upon the 
subtle message in order to confirm their anti-American beliefs.  
 The other diplomatic problem that the United States had was keeping a steady 
relationship with Pakistan while maintaining a relationship with India and avoiding a possible 
Pakistan-Soviet or Pakistan-Sino alliance.119  Cold War sentiments were still a basic part of U.S. 
foreign policy and avoiding a communist leaning Pakistan meant maintaining strong diplomatic 
connections.  The fear of Pakistan developing a close relationship with China or the Soviet 
Union kept the United States engaged in talks to avoid an unfavorable situation.120  In previous 
talks with the Johnson and Nixon administrations, Pakistan had been promised weapons and 
materials that they never received.121 The consistent promise of weapons between U.S. 
presidential administrations to the Pakistanis also caused tensions with India.  However, U.S. 
policy officials believed a disgruntled India was okay if it prevented a Pakistani/China/USSR 
alliance.122  Regardless of America’s willingness to deal in atomic material, Pakistan wanted a 
weapon in order to represent its power international community. 
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 For a country like Pakistan, the prospect showing off an atomic bomb appealed to their 
inferiority complex with India and allowed them to cement their position as a world power.  An 
atomic test would only confirm its power in the world and was at the core of Pakistan’s efforts to 
achieve a nuclear weapon. 123   S.P. Seth explains, “Bhutto’s promise that Pakistan will have a 
‘bomb’ even if its people have to eat grass neatly summed up this determination.”124  The 
Pakistan quest to achieve the atomic bomb was based in a desire to achieve the ability to stand 
tall with Western powers and to achieve the first atomic bomb in the Islamic world.  Dr. A. Q. 
Khan claimed, “If Pakistan had such a weapon, it would reinforce the power of the Muslim 
world.” He added, ‘All the Western countries, including Israel, are not only Pakistan’s enemies 
but also enemies of Islam…All this is part of the Crusades which the Christians and Jews 
initiated against the Muslims 1,000 years ago.”125 Pakistan, therefore, not only symbolizes the 
aspirations of the entire Islamic world, but also makes a strong claim to its leadership  
 The formation of British India into two separate countries laid the foundations for 
the conflicts between Pakistan and India during the twentieth century.  Encounters over 
Kashmir, civil war with East Pakistan, and a military coup d’état in the 1970s in Pakistan 
escalated tensions between the two South Asian countries and challenged diplomatic 
relations with the United States.  The successful Indian detonation of an atomic bomb and 
Pakistan’s nuclear quest all eventually contributed to a difficult presidency for incoming 
President Carter. 
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Chapter 2 – The Carter Question 
 On the day of his inauguration in 1977, Jimmy Carter faced the American people with 
excitement, a powerful vision, and hope for the future.  The last several years had been filled 
with scandal and the violent uprisings of the 1960s, and the new president sensed the fatigue and 
hope of the American people. "The world itself is now dominated by a new spirit,” the President 
said in his Inaugural Address. “Peoples more numerous and more politically aware are craving 
and now demanding their place in the sun—not just for the benefit of their own physical 
condition, but for basic human rights.”126 Carter came to the presidency with limited experience, 
but he brought a new passion to the White House and a desire to reestablish America’s role as 
the world’s most righteous government.127   
 Carter had been governor of Georgia in the early 1970s, but his ultimate goal was to 
become the president of the United States.128  As a candidate with state governance experience 
only, Carter had a significant disadvantage against the Republican candidate President Gerald 
Ford.129 Known more as a businessman than a politician, Carter seemed an odd choice as the 
Democratic Party’s nominee for president.130  Leslie Gelb of The New York Times argued that 
Carter had great potential as president, but his view of America’s foreign relations remained 
relatively unknown.    Despite his limited foreign policy experience, Carter received a 
nomination to the Trilateral Council, an organization dedicated to furthering relations between 
Western Europe, America, and Japan. Carter first met Zbigniew Brzezinski at the Trilateral 
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Commission, which became a key advisor to Carter on his foreign policy.131 Brzezinski later 
noted Carter began his candidacy with only 2% recognition from the general population when 
the he signed on to support the candidate.132 Carter’s utilized Brzezinski’s in regards to foreign 
policy, and promised the American people a change in American diplomacy around the world. 
Although the future president presented vague notions, it never resulted in an explicit plan to the 
American people and thus unexpected changes developed over time.133   
 During his campaign, one of Carter’s greatest strengths was his ability to gather support 
as the anti-establishment candidate.  Following the scandal of Watergate and Nixon’s 
resignation, Carter seemed an exciting alternative to the establishment members of Washington 
politics. John Herbers of the New York Times reported, “Nevertheless, Watergate, like the Great 
Depression of the 1930s and the Vietnam War, became implanted in the national psyche, as a 
unique event that raised basic questions about the American government.”134 Carter represented 
a change from a presidential administration that had made the public previously question the 
integrity of the government.135 
 The other large focus of Carter’s foreign policy during his campaign was to be the 
antithesis to the Nixon/Ford/Kissinger administrations.  Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s 
seemingly heavy handed and secretive approach in foreign policy gave him the nicknames the 
“Lone Ranger” and “a one-man policy of international adventure,” and a reputation for 
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“excessive secrecy in foreign affairs.”136 If elected president, Carter promised that his 
administration would include more conferences and summits to discuss important policy issues 
at all levels.137  He also wanted to rejuvenate partnerships with several U.S. allies in Western 
Europe, the Americas, and Japan.138  He also campaigned on the belief that the United States 
should include other democracies in foreign policy decisions.139  Although Carter wanted to 
model his administration differently, he still wanted to keep several of Ford/Kissinger’s policies 
on détente and opposed Congress interfering with the United States economic relations with 
Moscow.140   
 Carter focused on America’s position in the world, human rights, deemphasizing the Cold 
War, and morality during his campaign.141  Carter hoped that his foreign policy would encourage 
a “more active participation by other democracies in the resolution of international problems.”142  
David Skidmore explains, “The notion that the U.S. faced new limits on American power abroad 
spread widely through academic and foreign policy circles during the seventies.”143   He added, 
“America’s failure in Vietnam was only partly responsible for these perceptions.  The rise of the 
Soviet Union to military parity with the U.S., the economic revival of Europe and Japan, as well 
as the growth in the number of newly independent and increasingly nationalistic Third World 
countries all played a role in reinforcing the belief that the U.S. must adapt its policies to reflect 
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new global circumstances.”144  During Carter’s campaign, he stated, “the United States should 
not ‘become militarily involved in the national affairs of another nation’ nor back a leader who 
uses ‘repressive force against his own people.’”145   
 In reaction to the Vietnam War, Carter campaigned on the promise to avoid the mistakes 
of the previous administration. The president stated, “We will not behave in foreign places so as 
to violate our rules and standards here at home, for we know that the trust which our Nation 
earns is essential to our strength.”146 He did not adhere to the earlier administration’s standards 
of trying to impose American style constitutional democracies around the world while ignoring 
the human rights violations of those countries.147  For example, the Nixon administration 
maintained strong ties with South Korea and Chile despite of their appalling human rights 
records.148  Charles Mohr of the New York Times reported, “Mr. Carter said some regimes, such 
as South Korea and Chile, ‘openly violate human rights’ and that the United States should not 
‘condone repercussions’ but should use ‘our tremendous influence to increase freedom, 
particularly, in those countries that depend on us for their very survival.’”149 After winning the 
election, Carter went further to explain that the U.S. perception of another country would “shape 
our own people’s attitude toward that nation’s government.”150 
 Carter’s election as president came as a reaction against an era of government mistrust 
and secretive administrations that left many Americans disenchanted with their own 
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government.151  Former President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger embodied the 
characteristics that Carter campaigned against and the feeling of government suspicion that 
inundated the country, especially in regards to foreign policy. Kevin Mattson explains, “The past 
kept torturing the present with memories.  The failure in Vietnam, the fears and conspiracies 
nurtured by Watergate, the assassinations and violence in the 1960s – all these things pressed in 
on the nation’s psyche during the decade.”152    
 After he successfully campaigned for President, the vagueness of Carter’s foreign policy 
campaign promises began to create tensions on Embassy row, the area of Washington D.C. 
where most of the foreign embassy offices are located. His questionable position on American 
relations with other countries raised several questions within the international community about 
how they would be treated by the new president.  New York Times author Bernard Gwertzman 
explained, “Jimmy Carter’s victory has already caused a problem for virtually every foreign 
embassy here.  Whether it liked the Ford Administration’s policy toward its government or not, 
at least each embassy knew what it was and had grown accustomed to it.”153  Carter did not help 
his situation by refusing to meet with several foreign ambassadors before taking office and his 
notably off-hand approach throughout his entire presidency offended several ambassadors.154  
 In his Inaugural Address, Carter noted that, “The world is still engaged in a massive 
armaments race designed to ensure continuing equivalent strength among potential adversaries. 
We pledge perseverance and wisdom in our efforts to limit the world's armaments to those 
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necessary for each nation's own domestic safety. And we will move this year a step toward 
ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth.”155 Morality and the arms 
race were unavoidability tied together for President Carter, and he spent most of his presidency 
trying to change the world towards his goal of ridding it of weapons of mass destruction.   
 Carter believed emphasizing human rights would bring the government together.  Carter 
later reflected, “judging from news articles and direct communications from the American 
people to me during the first few months of my administration, human rights had become the 
central theme of our foreign policy in the minds of the press and public.”156  The progress 
towards human rights did have broad support from the American public, but Carter had a limited 
impact on the atrocities of the genocide in Cambodia and apartheid in South Africa.  “But the 
victims who survived and who had enough freedom to speak out applauded the American policy 
and believed that conditions would have been far worse had the United States remained 
silent.”157  Carter’s human rights initiative did have some impact on the international community, 
but it remained a confusing and disjointed effort until the end of his administration.158 
 Morality was also the central focus of his administration because the new president 
thought it would be easier to unite the country around ideals that had been lacking due to the 
scandals of the early 1970s.159 Carter also tied his moral views to the arms race.160  Hedrich 
Smith reported that for Carter, “this meant not just reducing the number of strategic nuclear 
weapons held by the United States and the Soviet Union, but also curbing conventional arms 
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sales to Third World nations and preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology."161  Carter 
was not only interested in the moralism of atomic weaponry, but he was also interested in 
reestablishing the moral authority of American citizens.  In Reversing Course, Skidmore argues 
that overemphasis on moralism does not completely explain Carter’s foreign policy decisions, 
since he was both a liberal policy maker and an idealist. Skidmore further explains, “Carter’s 
moralistic embrace of human rights was motivated not only by his own intense moral convictions 
but also by the belief that these sorts of appeals would bolster his own political fortunes and win 
support for his foreign policy reforms.”162  Carter believed that the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons threatened the future of the world.163   In a message to Congress, Carter argued “…if 
our (nuclear) policy is too weak, we could find ourselves powerless to restrain a deadly 
worldwide expansion of nuclear explosive capability.”164 
 The untested and unclear nature of Carter’s foreign policy was apparent before he took 
office, but his managerial style also affected the way he dealt with foreign issues. 165  Carter’s 
background as an engineer taught him a different approach to management and problem solving, 
which affected his ability to give a comprehensive foreign policy.  When any foreign crisis came 
to his attention, Carter handled the problem as its own separate situation and did not include 
broader context in his evaluations.  He had vague notions like human rights, arms control, and 
peace in the Middle East, but there was never any long term goal or structure given to the 
American people that they could readily understand and follow in the media.  Scott Kaufman 
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explains, “Maybe most important, he saw himself as someone whose job it was to solve 
individual problems rather than to give the American people a vision of where he planned to take 
the country.  The American public thus saw, more often than not, contradictory and inconsistent 
policies.  If Carter had a better grasp of both the possible and of Washington politics, his foreign 
policy record might have proven more successful."166  There were also some instances in which a 
policy Carter strongly believed in failed, like when talks regarding SALT II fell through and the 
failure of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  
 One other signature of Carter’s managerial style was his tendency to try to acquire all the 
necessary information from his advisors and provide a plan of action that the cabinet would be 
responsible for executing.  His Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, recalls, “He listened carefully 
and wanted the fullest discussion before making decisions.  He was, if anything, willing to 
permit debate to go on too long and to try and absorb every detail and nuance before making his 
decision.”167 This style had mixed results because the president had to rely on others in order to 
implement his policy, and they would often bring their own interpretations into the equation.168  
Kaufman states, “He tended to stitch together alternatives rather than make choices, which 
caused confusion as to what his policies were.  Instead of taking time to vet policies before trying 
to implement them, he sought to enact many initiatives at once.  As a result, policies interfered 
with one another or had to be so revised that they became inconsistent in their 
implementation.”169  The difficultly with the president trying to dictate all aspects of his policy 
caused increasing problems within the administration.   
                                                
166 Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 4. 
167 Vance, Hard Choices, 35. 
168 Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 3. 
169 Ibid., 4. 
 40 
 In order to create the feeling of a shared partnership and equality among the government 
departments, Carter attempted to craft a system where all of the White House staff members had 
equal access to the President.170  Jean Garrison explains, “Carter’s open, spokes-in-the-wheel 
system was organized to produce a collegial system in which the president was in the center of 
the wheel of information and advice.  In reality the president often left the policy details to his 
advisory group.”171  White House advisor Jody Powell explained, Carter designated his White 
House in a spokes and wheels approach in order to “make sure that no one or two people will be 
able to cut him [Carter] off from dissenting opinions.”172  Carter’s spokes-in-the-wheels 
approach lacked effectiveness because not every member of his cabinet had easy access to him, 
and it did not limit fighting within the bureaucracy. Those staff members with offices in the 
White House had significantly more access to the president than other groups.    For example, 
Brzezinski’s office as National Security Advisor was located within the White House, while 
Secretary of State Vance’s office was located within the State Department building.  Further, his 
constant traveling also kept him away from the White House.173  In comparison, Brzezinski 
stopped by the Oval Office so often for a quick chat with Carter that the staff stopped recording 
their meetings due to the frequency.174  The unevenness between the national security advisor 
and the secretary of state meant that one group achieved its goals more than the other.   
 Carter also had a different interpretation of his role as president than his predecessors, 
and this change dictated how he governed and how he interacted with congressional leaders.  
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Charles O. Jones explains that, "President Carter interpreted his representational role as that of 
the trustee - an official entrusted to represent the public or national interest, downplaying short-
term electoral considerations."175  Being a trustee president also meant that he felt that it was his 
responsibility to determine what the policies would be, and he tended to look down upon 
congressional leaders.   Kaufman states, "Carter did do a poor job of confronting governmental 
infighting, and he did see himself as a trustee of the American people, which caused problems 
with Congress.”176   His inability to compromise and work with congressional leaders made 
implementing his policies more difficult as his presidential tenure continued. He also did not 
develop a strong relationship with his own party member, which also contributed to problems 
with gathering support for his policies.  
 Carter’s foreign policy suffered in the transition from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
to Cyrus Vance.  When Vance was first announced as the secretary of state, he did have a brief 
meeting with Kissinger on foreign policy issues, but several international ambassadors were 
nervous about the transfer of power.177  The majority of the embassies in Washington D.C. raised 
questions about Carter’s administration because Kissinger’s departure caused great change 
without a concrete foreign policy being set in place by the new government.178  According to 
Bernard Gwertzman of The New York Times, “even his detractors [Kissinger’s] are saying that 
with his flair for the dramatic, his demanding criteria for excellence, and his ability to appoint 
good men to important jobs, he has left a mark on Foggy Bottom that will never be erased.”179  
                                                
175 Charles O. Jones, The Trusteeship Presidency: Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 217. 
176 Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 4. 
177 James Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2010), 35. 
178 Gwertzman, Bernard, “The Folks at Foggy Bottom View Life Without Kissinger,” New York 
Times, November 9, 1976, 10. 
179 Ibid. 
 42 
Each embassy knew its place within Kissinger’s sphere of influence.  Kissinger was extremely 
clear to foreign ambassadors about what their position was to the U.S. government and how they 
would be treated.   
 In order to create a strong foreign policy team, Carter appointed several individuals who 
had significantly more foreign affairs experience. Secretary of State Vance was a successful 
attorney with Foreign Service experience.180  Carter described Vance as, “cool under pressure, he 
had also served as special troubleshooter for more than one President when there were crises in 
Cyprus, Korea, and Vietnam.  Cy was very knowledgeable in both military matters and foreign 
affairs.”181  Carter reflects that Vance’s experience in law as a trial lawyer and his position on the 
Preparedness Investigation Committee, contributed to the decision for his appointment.  Started 
during in the 1950s, the Preparedness Investigation Committee became a powerful voice for 
defense issues and studied into missile and satellite weapons.182   His former appointments as 
Secretary of the Army and deputy defense secretary under Lyndon Johnson also made him a 
strong addition to Carter’s administration. Vance became a partner on the development of the 
more idealistic impulses of Carter’s diplomacy.  However, the president and Vance did not have 
a close personal relationship, and they were no more than acquaintances throughout Vance’s 
tenure as Secretary of State.183  
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 Betty Glad, a political scientist from South Carolina, explains that Vance was, “an able 
and experienced diplomat, dedicated to the task of fulfilling Carter’s more idealistic goals.”184  
When Carter and Vance first came together to discuss foreign policy issues, they agreed on most 
issues and both sought a more balanced relationship with the Soviet Union.  Vance recalls, 
“Carter shared my belief that we should continue to work for a reduction in tensions with the 
Soviet Union, while vigorously defending our global interests and maintaining an unquestioned 
military balance.”185  Carter described his own view of the Secretary of State, “my own 
preference was that one of the roles of the Secretary of State be the education of the American 
public about foreign policy.”186  President Carter’s view on the leader of the Department of State 
fit perfectly with what Vance brought to the administration.   
 When he accepted his position as Secretary of State, Vance made one request of the new 
president.  He wanted the responsibility for defining the administration’s foreign policy to fall to 
Carter and himself.  As Carter lost wide support from the national and international community, 
Brzezinski inserted himself more and more into the decision making process causing tension 
within the White House.187  Vance explains, “it also became a political liability, leaving the 
Congress and foreign governments with the impression that the administration did not know its 
own mind.  I warned the president of this danger and the confusion it was causing.”188  
 Vance represented Carter’s more idealistic notions of a closer relationship with the Soviet 
Union and the growth of human equality around the world. He strongly believed that the United 
States could create friendlier diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which could limit 
                                                
184 Glad, An Outsider in the White House, 1. 
185 Vance, Hard Choices, 31. 
186 Carter, Keeping Faith, 54. 
187 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 37. 
188 Ibid. 
 44 
military expansion in both countries. He also believed that the United States had a limited 
amount of power, which restricted its ability to intervene in conflicts around the world, an 
observation similar to Carter’s.189  During his campaign, Carter told the American people that the 
United States had to come to terms with the rise of other democracies and leaders around the 
world that might challenge the United States.190 Carter explained, “we must learn to live with 
diversity and to cooperate’ as long as such parties and leaders respect the democratic processes, 
uphold existing international commitments and are not subservient to external political 
direction.”191 
 Vance came to the White House with similar ideals and thoughts on the direction that 
American foreign policy should take during the Carter administration.  He later reflected, “Carter 
shared my belief that we should continue to work for a reduction in tensions with the Soviet 
Union, while vigorously defending our global interests and maintaining an unquestioned military 
balance.”192  The other aspect of Soviet relations that Carter and Vance wanted to conclude was 
the new SALT agreement in order to limit the spread of nuclear technology into Third World 
countries.193  Vance also strongly argued that the Third World should be given the proper 
attention from the international community, instead of the focus being focused on the East-West 
divisions of the Cold War.194 Vance recalls, “Carter shared my feeling that we should redefine 
and give higher priority to nuclear proliferation, international arms transfers, human rights, and 
international economic development and cooperation.”195   
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 To fill the position as his National Security Advisor, Carter chose Brzezinski. Considered 
a controversial choice at the time, Brzezinski was brilliant and informed, but his personal style 
had the potential to cause tensions within the administration.  A professor at Columbia 
University and a prolific author on the Soviet Union, Brzezinski soon became the backbone of 
the administration. The new national security advisor also brought many young men from New 
England to the new administration, in the hopes that they could bring new perspectives to the 
government and American foreign relations. 196 Carter claimed the National Security Council and 
Advisor; “Zbig was a first-rate thinker, very competent in his choice of staff members and able 
to work harmoniously with them (I do not remember any dissension at all).”197 
 Brzezinski had a decidedly aggressive view towards the Soviet Union and came to 
represent Carter’s more forceful policy. 198  Carter described Brzezinski as “astute in his 
analyses, particularly knowledgeable about broad historical trends affecting the industrialized 
nations, and a firm believer in a strong defense for our country and in the enhancement of 
freedom and democratic principles both here and abroad.”199 In contrast to Vance, Brzezinski did 
not support any type of pro-Soviet initiatives and constantly struggled with Vance over foreign 
policy.200  According to Betty Glad, Brzezinski viewed “the Soviet Union as a megalomaniac 
state bent on world domination, and he viewed U.S. military power and the threat that it might 
actually be utilized as one of the most important factors in shaping Soviet policies.”201  
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 When making his final decision for national security advisor, most of Carter’s advisors 
welcomed the suggestion with a few reservations.  Several individuals told Carter, “Dr. 
Brzezinski might not be adequately deferential to a secretary of state.”202  This actually served to 
Carter’s greater purpose as president, as he wanted “the final decisions on basic foreign policy 
would be made by me in the Oval Office, and not in the State Department.”203  Brzezinski’s 
aggressive stance as that national security advisor came from his anti-Soviet policies, and 
ultimately he used his leverage to gain control over the foreign policy of the United States. 
 Carter’s description of the State Department bureaucracy was decisively different than 
his rather favorable view of the smaller and more selective National Security Council.  He 
explains the State Department was, “a sprawling Washington and worldwide bureaucracy, with 
compartmentalized regional and national desks” and he “rarely received innovative ideas from its 
staff members about how to modify existing policy in order to meet changing conditions.”204 In 
contrast to Carter’s positive view of the National Security team under Brzezinski as a smaller, 
more contained unit.  Carter explains, “Brzezinski and his relatively small group of experts were 
not handicapped by the inertia of a tenured bureaucracy or the responsibility for implementing 
policies after they were evolved.  They were particularly adept at incisive analyses of strategic 
concepts, and were prolific in the production of new ideas, which they were always eager to 
present to me.”205  The opinions Carter had on the two departments laid the foundation for future 
problems. Kaufman explains, "Yet Carter never effectively reconciled the approaches of his 
secretary of state and NSC adviser, resulting in a policy that was inconsistent, incoherent, and 
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even contradictory.”206 The limitations that Carter put on the State Department in his own mind 
permitted a fracture within the administration’s spokes-in-the-wheel approach.   
 In the creation of his administration policies, Carter initially relied on Vance to inform 
the American public and international community regarding the decisions of the administration.   
As the administration continued to suffer problems, Brzezinski became the voice of the 
administration by 1980.  Brzezinski reflected, “His reluctance to speak up publicly, to provide a 
broad conceptual explanation for what our Administration was trying to do, and Carter’s lack of 
preparation for doing it himself, pushed me to the forefront.  (I will not claim I resisted strongly.)  
That in turn fueled resentments, if not initially on Cy’s part, then clearly so on the part of his 
subordinates.”207  Carter also notes, “Brzezinski was always ready and willing to explain our 
position on international matters, analyze a basic strategic interrelationship, or comment on a 
current event.”208 The development of Carter’s collegial environment began to suffer increasing 
organizational problems when Brzezinski overshadowed Vance as the voice of the 
administration.  
 Vance and Brzezinski did have problems between their different perspectives on foreign 
policy and the natural competition between their departments, but their personal relationship 
remained intact.  Brzezinski reflects, “I must say [Vance] is really a very pleasant person to deal 
with.  It would be difficult to imagine someone better as Secretary of State in terms of the 
personal relationship, even though I am often frustrated by what the Department of State stands 
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for.  There is no doubt he is a very good person-extremely loyal, highly dedicated, and willing to 
do what the President wishes without too much questioning.”209  
 When the international situation began to deteriorate, and Carter’s poll numbers dropped 
the president began to look towards Brzezinski.210  Glad explains, “A hardline Cold Warrior at 
heart, Brzezinski used his superior access and ability to frame issues, control agendas, and find 
allies to move Carter in the direction Brzezinski desired.”211  He also became a close friend with 
the president and the two would often spend time together outside the White House.  Carter 
reflects in his memoirs that, “Zbig had been my primary foreign affairs advisor during my 
presidential campaign and continued in this role as national security advisor.  He and I were in 
close contact throughout each day and had an excellent personal relationship.”212   He went on to 
discuss how, next to his family members, “Zbig would be my favorite seatmate on a long 
distance trip; we might argue, but I would never be bored.”213  Brzezinski became the dominant 
force in the administration.  
 Carter’s position on foreign affairs weakened in the late 1970s, as he dealt with several 
international crises that challenged American power and influence abroad. The Iranian 
Revolution that began in 1978 and resulted in Islamic fundamentalists seizing the U.S. Embassy 
in Tehran in November 1979 and taking of 50 hostages.214  Then in December 1979, the Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan. The situation in the Middle East deteriorated further with the 
storming of the holy site of Mecca by Muslim extremists in 1979. False reporting in Pakistan that 
Americans led the attack on the holiest site of Islam resulted in the storming of U.S. Embassy in 
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Pakistan.215  As Carter dealt with each of these situations, problems within his own 
administration became more apparent and led to American disillusionment with his policies. 
 In the beginning, Carter relied more heavily on Vance over Brzezinski in regards to 
policy; however, as criticism of his foreign policy increased after the takeover of the U.S. 
Embassy in Iran, Carter turned to Brzezinski in order to gain more public support.216  For 
example, Vance was a strong supporter of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and he thought 
that the Soviets would more readily agree to the treaty because it had an ending date within five 
years of its implementation.217  Glad explains, “But Cyrus Vance found his way blocked by a 
national security advisor who employed all the tactics noted in the management literature to 
move Carter in an anti-Soviet direction.” 218  Vance also believed in continuing of the U.S. 
prohibition of trading uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities and 
technologies.219  Brzezinski’s opposition to the treaty contributed to its eventual demise and is an 
example of the increased difficulties between Carter’s two top foreign policy advisors.  
 It became evident even during his early years as president that his policy on human rights 
would also experience problems.  In one instance, Carter supported Soviet dissidents because he 
felt that it was their human right to protest against their government, and he immediately angered 
the Kremlin.220  The policy on human rights became inconsistent because even when the U.S. 
government chastised a government for human rights violations, American corporations would 
continue to funnel money into the government in order to fulfill contracts.221  In certain 
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situations, Carter was also willing to abandon his moral policies in order to save face or protect 
American interests.222  For instance, the damage that Carter’s position on human rights caused 
meant that any nuclear negotiations were tainted with pessimism by non-nuclear countries.223  
For example, Carter’s interference with the governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in their 
efforts to acquire atomic weapons caused problems in diplomatic relations.  All three country’s 
were chastised by the U.S. government for human rights violations. 
 While Carter did bring change to the White House, he also had a difficult time 
implementing his foreign policy.  He committed several diplomatic gaffes during his 
administration, and he failed to sway his Middle Eastern and Indian allies to follow his policy 
decisions. For example, during a Middle East tour in 1978, he failed to get King Hussein of 
Jordon to join him for peace negotiations in Cairo or Indian Prime Minister Desai to agree to his 
nuclear goals of using the atom for peaceful purposes by allowing the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to inspect all nuclear weapons and materials. 224 Also, Carter was caught telling 
Secretary Cyrus Vance that he wanted to send a terse and cold letter to India regarding American 
concerns with their nuclear program.225  This statement circulated through the international press 
and negatively affected Carter’s image.  Perhaps moving the Middle East countries in line with 
his policies was unlikely since India’s relationship with Pakistan inhibited any possibility that a 
deal would be possible.  The rivalry between Pakistan and India was escalated by India’s 
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acquisition of a nuclear bomb, and Carter did not understand that it was unlikely to give up the 
nuclear power it had acquired.    
 In comparison, Carter’s broad and undefined foreign policy alienated several foreign 
officials before he officially took office.  When asked what his foreign policy would entail, he 
told diplomats that it would be similar to Kissinger’s and changes would be minimal.  However, 
Carter also discussed the importance he would place on elevating human rights issues around the 
world, which eventually created problems with the international community.  For example, 
Carter’s administration asked the Brazilian government to forgo their nuclear reprocessing aims 
and torturing its dissidents, but since most Brazilian citizens did not experience their 
government’s violence, they did not understand America’s stance.226  Carter’s decision to keep 
most aspects of Kissinger’s foreign policy did help alleviate the transition between the 
administrations, but the choice to emphasize human rights did put unnecessary strains on 
relations with U.S. allies. 
 Carter also had difficulty conveying his ideas and beliefs to the American people.  
Andrew Katz argues that Carter was unable to gain popular support for any of his foreign policy 
decisions because he misinterpreted the nature of a post-Vietnam War public opinion.227  Katz 
continues, “One key problem for Carter was that presidential leadership of public opinion had 
become problematic owning to the breakdown of elite consensus on foreign policy and greater 
public awareness of foreign policy issues.”228  The American public could no longer be 
convinced of a president’s position on his word alone, as it had become pessimistic and 
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untrusting of political leadership.229  In one particular speech from the Oval Office in April 1979, 
he essentially told the American people that they needed to find alternative sources of energy and 
limit oil consumption because of an oil crisis.230 Carter’s falling poll numbers and his difficulty 
swaying Americans towards his ideas limited his ability to convince the American public that his 
nuclear views were viable. 
 One of Carter’s main concerns, nuclear proliferation, did not become a primary focus of 
the United States in the Southeast Asian region until India detonated its atomic devise in 1974.231 
India began research into atomic power soon after it gained independence.  However, the country 
needed help in order to get the atomic program running and turned to the United States.  It signed 
thirty-year agreement with the United States in 1959 to build two nuclear reactors in India to 
provide power fuel.232  When the United States submitted the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to 
the world in 1968, India refused to sign the agreement stating that the treaty violated its 
sovereignty.  Instead, India used the technology given to them by the United States to create and 
detonate an atomic devise.233  The American agreement with India for nuclear power caused 
tensions with Pakistan and further fueled Pakistan’s quest for its own nuclear weapon.234  
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Although it happened before Carter’s time in office, the impacts of the non-proliferation directly 
impacted Garter’s negotiations concerning of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
 One of Carter’s early goals was to extend arms control and increase the power of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.  According to Hedrick Smith, “The President...has an almost 
“theological belief” in arms control.”235  This strong belief in limiting the expansion of arms to 
non-nuclear countries became the focus of his administration with Pakistan and its fledgling 
nuclear program being one of the most important. He also wished to limit China’s ability to 
spread nuclear information to the rest of the world.  At the time, China was clandestinely feeding 
information to Pakistan, which was contrary to his policy of ending the spread of nuclear 
weapons and information.236   
 In order to combat the weaknesses of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Carter’s 
administration began to create a new treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).   
Carter first discussed it during his presidential campaign and described as a five-year deal to halt 
all nuclear explosions and to continue limits on the proliferation of weapons.237   The end result 
was the development Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which included guidelines for nuclear 
testing and limited test explosions.  Several countries had refused to sign the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and Carter hoped that the new treaty would bring the international community together in 
agreement on nuclear issues.238  According to State Department officials, “We believe that states, 
which accept a CTBT, will have less incentive to develop nuclear weapons.  For example, to 
acquire the full "prestige" of possessing nuclear weapons, a state would need to demonstrate its 
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capability with a nuclear test.”239  The influence of the nuclear prestige factor on Indian and 
Pakistan laid the foundation for the development of atomic weapons.  Possessing a nuclear 
weapon could move a country away from the stigma of poverty and into the twentieth century.  
The memo goes on to explain,  “In addition, states motivated by national security concerns 
would encounter substantial uncertainties in perfecting their untested nuclear devices or 
designing more sophisticated weapons without testing.”240   
 The hope for the CTBT was to create an agreement that could be signed by Non-
Proliferation Treaty countries in order to help limit the spread proliferation.  The CTBT became 
Carter’s answer to the lingering doubts regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the 
international community.  The problem with the previously created Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty was the feeling among Third World countries that the treaty was designed to favor 
Western countries.  Kaufman explains, "Nonetheless, as in the case of human rights, the 
president never seemed able to come to grips with implementing the nuclear nonproliferation 
initiative.  Indeed, as in the case of human rights, he found he could not compartmentalize 
policies; rather, he had to compromise one initiative in the name of another.  Such became 
apparent in U.S. nonproliferation policy toward South Asia."241  
 Kaufman continues, “In general, the inability to test would reduce the advantages of 
acquiring nuclear weapons and would therefore diminish the incentive to undertake a weapons 
development program."242 For example, India, Israel, and Pakistan did not sign the Non-
Proliferation Treaty because they believed the treaty violated their sovereignty and there was 
also a belief that the treaty put developing countries at a disadvantage to established nuclear 
                                                
239 Ibid., 2. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 52. 
242 Ibid., 2. 
 55 
nations.243   India specifically objectified to the treaty because it allowed Western countries to 
detonate weapons for stockpile maintenance but not for weapons development, which is what 
India needed in order to complete its program.244 The CTBT also served to extend Carter’s 
strong beliefs in non-proliferation that he proclaimed during his campaign.  The administration 
claimed, "By demonstrating the willingness of the nuclear powers to accept restraints on their 
own nuclear capabilities Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would put the U.S. in a stronger 
position to carry out our non-proliferation strategy.  We could better press key non-nuclear states 
to accept restrictions on their activities."245   
 The successful test of an Indian nuclear weapon in 1974 alarmed Pakistan and turned its 
attention from nuclear energy to the quest for an atomic bomb that could compete with India’s.  
Pakistan’s quest for nuclear energy began in 1965 when it negotiated a deal with Canada to 
create a “heavy water reactor, the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP).”246  Pakistan was at 
a distinct disadvantage with India in the race for an atomic bomb because it lacked the capacity 
to reprocess the nuclear waste from the reactor.247  Pakistan had to reach an agreement with 
another nuclear power to turn its irradiated uranium into weapons grade plutonium.  The United 
States wished to limit Pakistan’s ability to create a weapon and imposed harsh economic 
sanctions in 1978; so, Pakistan looked to other, more favorable governments, for a deal.  France 
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eventually did brokered a deal with Pakistan in order to create a reprocessing facility; however, 
American pressure forced it to abandon the project.248  
 Carter was particularly uneven in his handling of Pakistan and India because in most 
situations he leaned favorably towards India, in spite of its weapons program. Kaufman writes, 
“Strategically, Carter determined that close relations with India were more vital to the protection 
of U.S. interests in the region than ties with Pakistan.”249  Kaufman also argues that during his 
tenure as president, Carter’s inclination towards India could be attributed to his own fascination 
with India since his mother spent time in the country as a member of the Peace Corps.250  Carter 
also supported the recent return to democracy and fair elections in India after the previous Prime 
Minister, Indira Gandhi, declared a two-year state emergency and did not allow elections.  
Pakistan was relatively stable under the leadership of General Zia, but his regime was brutal and 
free government elections were not held during his ten-year rule. 
 Carter also had significant problems with India in terms on the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since the country did not want to limit its nuclear 
expansion.  In a memo detailing the benefits of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, "Indian 
adherence to a CTB (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) would formalize Desai's (the Prime 
Minister of India) promise not to explode any more nuclear devices and extend this pledge 
beyond his term in office; only within the context of a comprehensive and non-discriminatory 
treaty would we expect India to adhere to a CTB."251  Carter hoped that getting India to agree to 
the CTBT would influence Pakistan’s desire to acquire an atomic devise. In another memo, 
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“Prime Minister Desai has indicated India is likely to agree to an adequate CTB, which would at 
least temporarily obligate India to refrain from further nuclear tests.  In addition, a CTB and a 
successful conclusion of SALT II are two of Desai's conditions for acceptance of full-scope 
safeguards on India's nuclear facilities.  While we cannot predict the final Indian decision, a 
limited duration CTB would clearly be more likely to influence the Indians than no treaty at 
all."252  
 Carter’s shelved several of his initiatives as he began to move towards a more hardline, 
Soviet centric policy in the latter half of his administration.253  The Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty was one of several initiatives that hit a dead end in favor of trying to contain the Soviet 
threat after the invasion Afghanistan.254  The policy also failed because of opposition from 
“Congress, the Pentagon, and the Energy Department to any proposal that might indefinitely 
suspend nuclear testing.”255  Carter’s efforts to limiting the testing and acquisition of atomic 
weapons received some positive reviews, but the policy was a failure in the reality of the 
international climate of Soviet pressure and proliferation. 
 In order to help determine what U.S. aid would be given abroad, the Glenn Amendment 
became the standard document to determine what countries would be eligible for aid.  Originally 
called the Symington Amendment, the Congress renamed the amendment for its strongest 
supporter, former astronaut and then Senator John Glenn; the Glenn Amendment stated that no 
aid could be given to a country actively seeking nuclear technology or a country that abused 
human rights.256  “The Symington [Glenn] Amendment,” the NSA noted in June 1977. “Requires 
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us to terminate economic and military assistance if Pakistan receives reprocessing equipment, 
material or technology.”257 
 Brzezinski explains, "Seeking to bolster its position in and around the Indian Ocean and 
Persian Gulf, Carter sought to restore ties with the government of Muhammad Zia-ul-
Haq.  Citing human rights violations by Islamabad as well as Pakistan's apparent effort to 
develop nuclear weapons, the Carter administration in 1977 had suspended economic aid to 
Pakistan, and withdrawn an offer to sell A-7 fighter jets to that nation.”258 After reviewing 
Pakistan’s economic and military situation, Carter decided to reestablish aid to Pakistan, but in a 
later review he decided to rescind his promise of monetary aid only to reestablish support after 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  This backwards and forwards approach showed the 
Pakistanis that the United States was an unstable ally that would give and take monetary aid 
quickly without much concern for the Pakistanis.  Carter only decided to aid Pakistan when the 
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the U.S. government used Pakistan in order to help 
smuggle weapons and supplies to the freedom fighters in Afghanistan.259 
 President Carter began his presidency with a belief in a new world order, free from the 
fear of an atomic attack and based in strong moral leadership from the United States.  The 
development of this ideal world did not come to fruition despite valiant efforts.  Carter 
campaigned on his belief in the limitations of atomic weapons and the CTBT showed his 
dedication to the mission and his desire to include all countries including Pakistan.  The failure 
of the treaty was due to a variety of factors, but Carter’s push for a potentially unpopular treaty 
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shows his dedication. Although he was not entirely successful with his goals and agenda, his 
passion impacted America as he tried to lead it to a future without atomic weaponry. 
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Chapter 3 – Pakistan, A Nuclear Country 
 The proliferation of nuclear weapons was an international trend that President Jimmy 
Carter sought to end during his presidency.  When it became clear that Pakistan had devoted 
itself to the acquisition of nuclear materials with the ultimate goal of building an atomic weapon, 
the Carter administration began the difficult task of trying to rein in a country that believed 
nuclear weapons meant security.  A contract between France and Pakistan to build a nuclear 
reprocessing facility, a plant that could take spent nuclear fuel rods and turn them into weapons 
grade plutonium, became a great concern to the international community and especially the 
United States.260  In order to try and contain the threat, the United States began an international 
campaign to limit Pakistan’s access to nuclear materials.  Messages and briefings between the 
U.S. government and her allies abroad showed great concern regarding a nuclear Pakistan and 
reveal the variety of steps the international community took to slow down the South Asian 
country.  The international interaction also shows the failure of the Carter administration to halt 
Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and demonstrates that Carter’s policies had minimal affects on a 
country dedicated to the development of a nuclear weapon. 
 Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s greatest goal while in office was to 
develop an atomic weapon for Pakistan and he began his efforts soon after he came to power in 
1971.261   Pakistan had a strong history of scientific endeavors, which laid the groundwork for 
Bhutto’s atomic quest.262  In January 1972, Bhutto hastily called together fifty of Pakistan’s top 
scientists and government officials for what was to be a secret meeting to discuss the country’s 
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nuclear options.263  Pakistan’s nuclear program began to intensify after 1974 as a reaction to 
India’s detonation of an atomic devise.  In order to justify its ambitions to the international 
community, Pakistan argued publically that its need for security against India and the prestige of 
being a nuclear country justified its actions. The United States believed that Pakistan’s 
motivation in its quest for nuclear weapons was the prestige factor, which would allow it to 
move beyond its Third World status.264 However, other reports suggested that the country was 
more strongly influenced by its belief that India threatened its national security.265  With several 
conflicts occurring between 1949-1971, Pakistan felt constantly threated by its Hindu neighbor 
and hoped that by developing its own atomic device the countries would again be equal rivals.   
 The unpublicized reason Pakistan wanted an atomic weapon was to cement itself as a 
powerful member of the Muslim community.266  This was probably the most troubling to the 
Carter administration since it had no reasoning other than to promote antagonism with non-
Muslim countries, specifically Israel and India, and to eventually spread nuclear technology to 
unstable Middle Eastern countries.267  Before he was disposed, Pakistani Prime Bhutto also 
supported the Muslim theory as he claimed that Pakistan was close to becoming a nuclear state 
and “he pointed out that only the Muslim world was without nuclear capability and said Pakistan 
would share the technology with Islamic states.”268  He also stated that Pakistan would “eat 
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grass” in order to acquire a nuclear weapon.269  Bhutto’s successor, General Zia, explained his 
country’s Muslim outlook in an interview in July 1978. Zia stated, “No Muslim country has any 
(atomic arms).  If Pakistan possesses such a weapon it would reinforce the power of the Muslim 
world.”270  The United States considered this comment to be a political gaffe for Zia and found 
all these statements disquieting.271  
 In the mid-1960s, Pakistan placed an order with Canada to build a nuclear power plant 
that would largely financed by the Muslim world.272  At the time, the Canadians were actively 
looking for nuclear export orders and the facility would eventually supply some 137 million 
watts of electricity for the Pakistanis.273  They built the civilian standard Candu natural uranium 
reactor at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant [KANUPP] in February 1974.  The benefit of this 
reactor for Pakistan is that the design allowed it to potentially build nuclear weapons covertly.274  
This plant design left large cashes of irradiated fuel that could be reprocessed into weapons-
grade plutonium.275  Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney explain, “[Prime Minister] Bhutto’s 
plan… was to use the plutonium from the Candu reactor to make his first atom bombs.”276  
However, Pakistan needed a reprocessing plant to recycle the spent fuel rods before they could 
develop nuclear weapons.  France soon agreed to fill this void and supply the reprocessing 
facility that would allow Pakistan to expand its fledgling nuclear program. 
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 In 1976, Pakistan signed the deal with France to build a reprocessing facility that would 
process irradiated nuclear reactor fuel into plutonium suitable for weapons or energy.277  There 
were immediate concerns in the international community that Pakistan wished to use the French 
plant to create weapons-grade nuclear material.  New York Times reporter Jonathan Kandell 
explained, “Despite Pakistani assertions that the plutonium extracted from its French plant would 
not be used for military purposes, there have been widespread fears that Pakistan would seek to 
build a nuclear bomb to counter India’s breakthrough.”278  The fuel produced from the French 
process would not be useable for fifteen to twenty years, but the Carter administration saw the 
reprocessing as an unnecessary risk.279   The potential of the plant worried President Carter and 
was in contrast to his non-proliferation goals. 
 At the time the original reprocessing deal with France was completed, Pakistan was under 
the leadership of Bhutto. When Bhutto came to power in 1971, the country was in disarray after 
the civil war in 1971 and Bhutto soon became the dominant political power as the leader the 
Pakistan’s People Party.  Bhutto played a strong leadership role during the war and he became a 
critical force in the rebuilding of Pakistan.  When he called for elections amidst mounting 
political pressure in 1976, his influence over the people had waned.280  Bhutto was confident that 
his countrymen would vote for his party in overwhelming numbers, but the opposition party 
managed to gain traction at the last minute and seemed headed to victory the election.281  
Bhutto’s party, the Pakistan’s People Party, won the election in 1977 with a remarkable 93% of 
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the vote.  
 Allegations of rigged elections soon abounded since the opposition party strongholds 
went suspiciously to the Pakistan’s People Party.282  Opposition party members took to the 
streets and began riots that resulted in looting and civilian deaths.283  According to Henry 
Kissinger, “Bhutto destroyed himself by seeking a popular mandate too rapidly and then 
manipulating the electoral result.”284  The military responded to the mixed election results by 
leading a coup d’état’s in March 1977.  On July 5, 1977, military officials arrested Bhutto for the 
attempted murder of a political opponent, Ajmad Raza Kasuri, and tampering with election 
results.285   Another charge against Bhutto was that he was a Muslim in name only, and he did 
not have the right to represent a Muslim country.286  The military, under the command of General 
Mohammad Zia, committed a bloodless coup in order to stabilize the country and established 
martial law.287 The arrest and eventual trial of Bhutto showed the strength of the military in 
determining the course of the country.  
 The Bhutto trial commenced in 1977.  During the trial, Bhutto argued that any judgment 
would be biased towards a guilty verdict because General Zia and other generals thought that 
Bhutto’s obstructed their future plans for an indefinite rule.288  One of the court judges and 
General Zia both expressed their belief in a guilty conviction and any evidence Bhutto was 
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allowed to submit at trial was in a closed court cession.289  Most of the evidence provided in the 
trial was hearsay and would not have been admissible in most Western courts of law.290   
Reporter Hugh Trevor-Roper reflects that, “The basic fact is that the army is the sole public force 
in Pakistan, and having generally ruled the country, presumes that it has a natural right to 
rule.”291    Bhutto’s arrest and trial proved that the military would retain power at any cost and 
that all public officials were subject to its whims.  The Pakistani court ultimately found him 
guilty and sentenced him to death.   
 Bhutto initially refused to appeal his death sentence on the basis that his appeal would 
legitimize a process that he thought was biased from the beginning.292  After a review with his 
attorneys, Bhutto decided to file an appeal.  Bhutto’s lawyers insisted that countries around the 
world, especially the United States, should raise concerns over the ruling.  Attorney Yahya 
Bakhtiar stated, “the countries that care about human rights-and especially the Americans-should 
raise their voices against it.” He declared, “The man never had a fair trial and he must not be 
killed.”293   Amnesty International protested the death sentence on humanitarian groups and 
condemned the government for its decision that “it saw as the high-handed authoritarianism of 
the Zia government.”294  Other countries that protested the decision were Libya and the United 
Arab Emirates and as Islamic states, they carried a lot of weight. President Carter reacted with 
great concern to Pakistan’s treatment of Bhutto.  In line with his policy of encouraging and 
engaging in human rights, Carter sent several letters to General Zia and requested clemency for 
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the deposed Prime Minister.  In his diary, Carter states; “I sent another message to General 
[Muhammad] Zia [in Pakistan], asking him on humanitarian grounds to spare the life of [former 
president Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto.”295  The president’s request did not move Zia, and Bhutto was 
hung a week later.296   
 Bhutto’s arrest brought about a string of extremist violence to the country.  In one 
instance, four young men doused themselves with gasoline and burned themselves alive in a 
protest against Bhutto’s conviction and impending execution.  As the young men died, they 
chanted “Free Bhutto now” and vowed that more violence would happen if Bhutto were 
executed. 297   The New York Times also reported that, “already there are reports of thousands of 
new jailing’s by the Zia regime.”298  Bhutto’s arrest also stunned the Pakistani people because he 
was the leader who pulled Pakistan out of its demoralizing defeat over Bangladesh and had 
successfully led the country for five and a half years.  The idea that he would be put to death 
troubled large sections of the population.299 Instability in the region also increased as the 
government struggled to maintain control over a radicalized population influenced by the growth 
of conservative Islam within the government.300  Islam had always been an important part of life 
in Pakistan and influenced the decision to create a separate Muslim country from India, but as 
Islam became increasingly radicalized in the late 1970s it was incorporated into the government 
of Muslim dominated countries.301 
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 Zia played an important role with the development and governance of Pakistan during the 
Carter administration and was a key figure in Pakistan’s development of the atomic bomb.302  A 
journalist described Zia as “a tough professional soldier in the spit-and-polish tradition of the 
British-trained Pakistan Army.”303  Zia took his opportunity in the confusion after the election to 
take control of the country and enforce martial law.  Under military leadership, Zia’s government 
drastically changed it from a Western tradition to an ideological regime based on traditional 
Muslim beliefs.  Rashid explains, “He (Zia) frequently invoked a ‘divine mission’: ‘I have a 
mission, given by God, to bring Islamic order to Pakistan,’ he said in 1978.  Zia banned politics 
and censored the media, while his new Islamic laws victimized non-Muslim minorities and 
women.304  
 A devout Muslim, Zia also increased the presence of Islam in every part of Pakistan’s 
government including the inclusion of Islamists in the military and the sponsorship of militant 
Islam.  Rashid states, “after launching a coup against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Mohammad Ziaul 
Haq, once an obscure general known for his personal piety, religiosity, and humility, turned into 
a ferocious instrument of change for Pakistan.”305  For example, Pakistan sent military supplies 
to Afghanistan to help them resist the Soviet invasion in December 1979; and censorship, public 
floggings, and torture became more common forms of punishment as the government became 
more extreme.306 Zia also used Islam in order to justify the military dictatorship that he created 
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and lavished millions of dollars in gifts on his generals, creating a new class of wealthy generals 
who increased the power and influence of the military for future generations.307  
 Pakistan’s complicated history of conflict between an underdeveloped political system 
and an overly developed military system, allowed the power of the military apparatus to grow. 
Shuja Nawaz reports, "Pakistan's history is one of conflict between an underdeveloped political 
system and a well organized army that grew in numbers and political strength as a counter 
weight to a hostile India next door in relation to the domestic political system.”  Former Army 
Chief General Jehangir Karamat claimed: “Whenever there is a breakdown in stability, as has 
happened frequently in Pakistan, the military translates its potential into the will to dominate, and 
we have military intervention followed by military rule.”308  Pakistan’s military state played an 
important role in the development of Pakistan’s atomic bomb as the dominate power in the South 
Asian country. 
 The U.S. reaction to Pakistan during the Carter administration varied from a close 
relationship to a slightly hostile one over the nuclear issue. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
explained,  “In South Asia, mutual suspicions between India and Pakistan harm the security of 
both and heighten the regional danger.  We will continue to support their efforts to resolve the 
issues dividing them.  We seek good relations with both.  Our assistance to either one is not 
directed at the other.”309  The recognition of these tensions showed that the Carter 
Administration had a basic understanding of the roots of the Pakistani atomic program.310 
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 Zia believed Pakistan’s ability to develop a reprocessing facility was crucial for the 
country’s ability to become an atomic power and reacted negatively when the United States 
began to pressure France in 1977 to end its contract with Pakistan.311 In September 1977, French 
Prime Minister Raymond Barre mentioned to Carter privately the sale of nuclear reprocessing 
equipment to Pakistan.312  The United States experienced some success in dissuading France 
from completing the contract, and France announced in January 1978 after a visit from President 
Carter that it would possibly consider altering Pakistan’s contract.313 Jonathan Kandell reported, 
“President Carter, who visited here [France] last week, has been seeking the cooperation of other 
Western countries in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the sale to developing 
countries of reprocessing equipment that produces fissionable plutonium.”314  For example, 
Carter also put pressure on West Germany to end its contract with Brazil, leading to a 
considerable cooling of the relations between the United States, West Germany, and Brazil.315   
 The United States was aware of the strict differences in the danger between a simple 
weapons ready device that could only be tested once and a weapons system that could attack 
other countries systematically.316   As the Pakistanis ran out of nuclear materials, the United 
States knew that they would look to other countries, like China, in order to alleviate the strain or 
they would develop other materials that were not up to international standards.317 The Pakistanis 
had made a recent discovery of a 150-ton deposit of uranium that could be mined and refined for 
weapons grade energy.  Pakistan had also approached Niger for uranium since the mining in 
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Pakistan would take time and the African nation did not have strong restrictions on its uranium 
exports.318 
 In a letter to the Deputy Secretary of State, the special presidential representative for non-
proliferation matters Gerard Smith tried to explain that Pakistan’s development of nuclear 
weapons posed one of the greatest international threats since 1945.319  Smith believed that 
rewarding Pakistan with military and economic aid would not end Pakistani’s quest for the 
atomic bomb, although he believed that an Indian/Pakistani alliance could have the potential to 
end the nuclear stand off.320  Smith claimed, “If Pakistan persists, India is bound to develop 
nuclear weapons and then where does the process stop.”321  
 For its nuclear power facility KANUPP, the United States estimated that Pakistan’s 
supplies would be exhausted by the summer of 1978 since Canada was no longer supplying the 
nuclear fuel. Pakistan had previously relied upon Canada for heavy water, fuel, spare parts, and 
emergency repairs for the reactor since the Canadians originally built the reactor. 322 After Indian 
detonated its atomic bomb from a plant and material supplied by Canada, the Canadian 
government decided that it would end its nuclear cooperation program and generally limit its 
own ability to spread nuclear technology.323  Pakistan’s dedication to a nuclear reprocessing 
plant only solidified Canada’s decision.324  The United States considered China as a potential 
replacement for Canada as the supplier of fuel for the reprocessing facility.325   The Chinese had 
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limited experience utilizing heavy water reactors and the facility they built lacked all the 
technical achievements of Western nuclear powers. Pakistan’s nuclear power facility was only 
the first step in the quest for an atomic devise, but the international community’s decision to 
restrict exports of nuclear material limited Pakistan’s ability to expand its nuclear pursuit. 
 The close relations between France and the United States in regards to the Pakistani issue 
meant that American officials learned of France’s decision to suspend its contract before the 
Pakistanis.326 U.S. officials met with French officials for a couple of days to discuss the issue of 
the reprocessing plant and if France would honor the original contract.  The French informed the 
United States that it would end the contract for the reprocessing facility on May 29, 1978, before 
Pakistan officially was scheduled to receive the news on May 31. Two American goals after 
Pakistan received the news were to temper the Pakistani reaction to France and to dissuade them 
from trying to develop the nuclear option on their own.327  In keeping with Carter’s foreign 
policy, the United States kept the Iranian Shah informed of the decision as well as reassured 
India regarding its security concerns.328   
 The French were upset that U.S. Ambassador Art Hummel informed the Chinese 
Ambassador to Pakistan regarding the French decision to end the reprocessing deal before the 
Pakistanis were informed.329  The initiative that Hummel took damaged French-Pakistan 
relations because the decision was supposed to be confidential and France looked like it bowed 
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to pressure from the United States, something the European country was desperate to avoid.330  
The French also expressed their belief that the Chinese sided with Pakistan on the security 
concerns and supported Pakistan’s quest for an atomic bomb.331  Close relations with France did 
allow the United States to influence the cessation of France’s Pakistan deal, although the 
decision had unforeseen consequences for the U.S. relations with the European country.   
 In order to offer an official response, France’s Prime Minister Giscard sent a letter to 
Pakistan explaining the reasoning for the cessation of the reprocessing plant and followed this 
with a visit by Andre Jacomet, the Secretary of France’s official Council on Foreign Nuclear 
Policy.332  The Giscard letter actually held little information on the processing plant and instead 
discussed the possibility of changing the processing plant from one “capable of producing pure 
weapons-grade plutonium.”  The purpose of the facility is the manufacture of the byproduct of 
the enriched uranium from the power plants and reprocessing the material into “‘dirty’ plutonium 
mixed with uranium that is unsuitable for atomic arms.”333  The implications in the letter were 
clear. There would be no more shipments to the plant and the contract was terminated.  
Pakistan’s initial opposition to Giscard’s letter was because the Pakistanis were interested in the 
development of atomic weapons and not just atomic energy like they claimed. Pakistan 
demanded that the French review the decision, reinstate the original contract, and build the plant.  
It argued that all international guidelines had been followed to prevent the misuse of the 
plutonium, and there was no need cancel the project.334 
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 The United States wanted an official Pakistani response to the letter in order to make sure 
that the understanding of the termination was clear.  French representative Jacomet explained 
that there would be no official response from France in order to avoid public backlash by the 
Gaullist opposition supported by Jacques Chirac.335 The French did not believe an official 
response would be necessary in order to inform the United States that all nuclear exports from 
France had ceased and they also believed that there would be no more word from Pakistan on the 
issue.336 Jacomet believed that the entire situation with Pakistan had resolved itself with minimal 
problems and that the United States should move toward the resumption of assistance in order to 
increase the probability of moderation.337  
 The United States did not confirm if it had made any decisions regarding demarches 
following the France’s decision to terminate the contract.338  The State Department claimed, “We 
are now reviewing our position on resumption of aid and military sales to Pakistan but have not 
yet taken any firm decisions.  An assurance from the French that the reprocessing deal is 
definitely off and that no transfers of equipment, materials or technology have been made since 
enactment of the Glenn Amendment (August 4, 1977) would be very useful when we consult 
with key members of congress.”339  Regardless of France’s termination of the contract, the 
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United States was still nervous about reestablishing aid with Pakistan based upon its history and 
the beliefs of congressional members and intelligence reports.340 
 Since the French reprocessing plant option had been eliminated, the United States 
expected Pakistan to research other options including the development of an “indigenous 
centrifuge enrichment capability.”341  The threat of an indigenous facility was not immediate 
since the Pakistani’s lacked the suppliers and sensitive equipment needed to finish the plant.  
However, there was some concern that the Pakistani’s would try to finish the French plant, even 
if it they would be a smaller, less efficient, and less sophisticated one.342  
 In November 1978, the French officially reaffirmed to the United States that its decision 
to end the reprocessing plant contract with Pakistan was absolute and there were no plans to 
move away from that decision.343  There were still some questions because some French 
technicians were still working in Pakistan and the United States wanted them removed. France 
assured the United States that the two French technicians still in Pakistan were working only on 
civil engineering projects based at the nuclear site, but they did not have access to any sensitive 
material.344   Zia wrote a response to French Prime Minister Valery Giscard that he wished to 
continue Franco-Pakistani relations and wished to continue their cooperation in other fields.  The 
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State Department reported, “France still hoped to avoid a confrontation with Pakistan and thus 
was continuing to maintain a dialogue with the Pakistani government.”345  
 Ambassador Hummel relayed to his superiors in Washington his concern that in order to 
obstruct Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions they needed to discuss their concerns with India.  
However, it would have been detrimental to U.S./Pakistan relations if the information were 
leaked to the press that America discussed Pakistan’s security concerns with India.346  At this 
point, India did not have any solid information regarding the program, but the United States was 
willing to disclose this information but only in a confidential way.347  The problem was that the 
information would most likely be funneled back to Pakistan.348 
 On November 4, 1978, the United States sent a letter to its nuclear allies explaining 
Pakistan’s quest for an atomic weapon and its need for gas centrifuges.  The goal of this message 
was to prevent Pakistan from receiving materials from other countries.  It hoped to discourage its 
allies from exporting nuclear materials in violation of international nuclear non-proliferation 
agreements.349  A State Department memo states, “In addition we are increasingly concerned 
about the geopolitical situation in South Asia, as a result of the Afghan Revolution and growing 
instability in Iran.  We believe it is critical to stability in the region and to our non-proliferation 
objectives to inhibit Pakistan from moving closer to the threshold of nuclear explosive 
capability.”350  It added, “We are in close touch with following governments on this matter: 
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Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The 
Netherlands, U.S. and West Germany.” 351 The memorandum concluded, “The U.S. believes that 
your government should be in possession of these facts in order that it may exercise vigilance 
and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities which would permit 
then to develop nuclear explosive capability.” 352   The United States also requested any further 
information on the matter that these countries could provide and stated that the United States 
would and any exports to countries that sent nuclear materials to Pakistan.353 
 The United Kingdom also had information that the Pakistanis were in the pursuit of gas 
centrifuge and an enrichment facility.354  Ambassador to the United Kingdom Kingman Brewster 
stated, “If Pakistan were to succeed in its efforts, we believe a particularly dangerous risk of 
nuclear proliferation would arise in Pakistan, with profound implications for the Middle East as 
well as the subcontinent.”355  As a close ally to the United States, the United Kingdom discussed 
the gas centrifuge situation with American representatives frequently and supported the U.S. 
position. 
 Sweden responded to the American report by stating that it understood the implications 
and would follow the U.S. recommendations.356 The United States also determined that the 
Swedes were not going to extend their weapon sales especially for inverters.  The Swedes were 
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reluctant to extend their controls over exports without more information and British support.  It 
was agreed that communication would be continued.357 
 The Indian government was aware for some time that Pakistan was bent on achieving 
nuclear weapons capability.  In the beginning, the Indians did not seem concerned that about 
Pakistan’s intention for an atomic weapon.  India’s concern only arose when it became apparent 
that Pakistan might be within two to three years of becoming an atomic power.358  India also 
named an undisclosed country to the United States that was assisting in Pakistani efforts (most 
likely China). The ambassador to India reflected that the Indians tended to think the worst of 
Pakistan and would enforce their foreign policy as such.359  
 In Belgium, the Foreign Ministry official “Who was last Ambassador to Peking and 
knows Asia from long experience, endorsed our reasons for concern Pakistan.  He said he had no 
doubt that Bhutto, a demagogue, had set his sights on a nuclear capability for Pakistan.  What he 
set in motion there was not likely to be scrapped voluntarily.” The Belgium government 
reiterated its position on non-proliferation and declared it would not participate in the trade of 
nuclear weapons or materials to Pakistan.360 
 The Austrians had not previously been aware of Pakistan’s efforts to build an atomic 
bomb.  The United States requested that Austria contact U.S. officials if Pakistan asked to 
purchase nuclear materials.  Alois Reitbauer, an Austrian official, replied that, “he clearly 
understood the dangers of Pakistan becoming a nuclear power, and said ‘we shall do everything 
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possible to prevent export’ from Austria.  He said that he was not aware that the Pakistanis had 
made any attempts to get material in Austria, but that he would try to find out and let us 
know.”361  Austrian Ambassador Milton Wolf reported, “I concluded by telling Reitbauer that we 
are contacting all countries who could supply materials or technology to warn them about the 
Pakistani intentions.”362  Reitbauer also questioned if the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) had been informed about the Pakistani situation, and stated that Austria would not 
inform it without U.S. confirmation. The ambassador concluded the cable, “Finally (Reitbauer) 
said that Austria takes its obligations under the non-proliferation treaty very seriously and said 
that we can be assured on the fullest Austrian cooperation in this matter.”363  
 The information passed to Japan regarding Pakistan received a different reaction than 
most Western countries.  Due their shared status’ as Asian countries, Japan and Pakistan had 
recently had bilateral negotiations and the Pakistani foreign ministry did not mention their 
motivations toward becoming a nuclear power.  The only other item they discussed was the 
reprocessing plant from France, and Pakistan expressed annoyance regarding American 
interference.  Japan’s Ambassador reported, “Takashima said that GOJ [Government of Japan] 
shared U.S. views on dangers of Pakistani moves, although he conveyed his impression that 
Pakistan felt particularly threatened by recent events in Afghanistan and instability in 
subcontinent.”364  
 The Netherlands Foreign Minister Van Der Klaauw shared U.S. concerns about 
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proliferation and strongly agreed with the principles of non-proliferation.365  Van Der Klaauw 
also believed that former Prime Minister Bhutto had exaggerated regarding Pakistan’s nuclear 
proficiency, but stated he was not convinced. He also supported the U.S. position that the 
Comprehensive Test Ban was important in controlling Pakistan.  The Ambassador reported, 
"During his recent visit to India, he said to the Indians that it would be important for them to 
adhere to the CTB in the future: the Indians were non-committal in their response and said only 
that they would have to study the matter."366   The diplomatic cable went on to state, “Nuclear 
technology was still considered the mark of a truly industrialized culture. In addition, it would 
help them meet their very real energy needs and they ask why they, the poorer countries, should 
be excluded from the benefits of nuclear powers.  He said this is a psychological question which 
must be addressed by the West."367  
 As a country with a previous relationship with Pakistan, Canada was largely aware of 
Pakistan’s quest to become a nuclear state. Canadian Under-Secretary Klaus Goldschlag, 
supported U.S. measures and stated that he was under the impression that Canada had already cut 
off any nuclear assistance to Pakistan.  He added that any efforts on the part of Pakistan to gain 
more assistance would be dismissed.  He also asked that any information the United States had 
regarding Pakistani attempts to contact Canadian sites be relayed to them immediately.368 
 Ambassador to West Germany Walter John Stoessel "made the point and repeated it later 
that it could do serious damage to West's relations with Pakistan, were news of USG approach to 
leak (regarding French relations).  Headline 'U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany in nuclear 
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boycott of Pakistan' was last thing he wanted to see at this juncture in relations with Pakistan and 
its neighbors.  We heartily concurred."369 Assistant Secretary Laustenschlager stated that the 
FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] would take the U.S. "approach fully into account should 
there be any attempt by Pakistan to acquire reprocessing technology, or equipment in 
FRG."370   He reemphasized West Germany’s 1977 decision to not export sensitive technology 
and equipment and it would evaluate any Pakistan request by reviewing the IAEA guidelines and 
supplier club rules.371  He also stated that West Germany had more control over the exports of 
other nuclear materials and information to other countries, given the stringent requirement for 
permits and licenses.   
 Italy had reports similar to United States assertions regarding Pakistan's development of 
the atomic bomb, but had received no request from Pakistan regarding weaponry, technology, or 
information.372 Australia received notification in an oral brief by acting Deputy Secretary Roy 
Fernandez and reiterated Australia position as a Non-Proliferation Treaty country.373  The 
Spanish had heard from the British and agreed with its assessment of the situation and the steps 
taken to prevent Pakistan’s acquisition of the atomic bomb.374  Spain was grateful for being 
informed but it did not offer any further information.375  Several of the countries contacted did 
not have any relevant information to give to the United States regarding the situation and merely 
extended support.   
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 The Pakistanis were frustrated by the lack of U.S. support for their position regarding the 
reprocessing plant, and Hummel explained that normalizing relations with the United States 
would be the first step towards the revival of economic and military aid.376 According to 
Congressmen Clement Zablocki from Wisconsin and Senator John Glenn from Ohio, it would be 
difficult for Pakistan to receive aid because Congress was still deeply suspicious of Pakistan’s 
nuclear intentions.377  According to Brzezinski, in 1978, “American non-proliferation policy was 
further strengthened by the Glenn/Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which 
called for a cutoff of economic assistance to any country which did not accept safeguards on 
dangerous nuclear technology.”378  Pakistan was the first major test to this new foreign policy 
and the decision was made to eventually suspend aid in 1979.  Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher stated in the memo, “In order to receive aid, Congress and the American people 
would insist upon a public declaration that Pakistan would halt its nuclear aspirations.”379   
 Senator Glenn helped to establish the Glenn Amendment and became the key monitor of 
nuclear issues in the Senate.  According to the Brzezinski, the Glenn Amendment “…called for a 
cutoff of economic assistance to any country which did not accept safeguards on dangerous 
nuclear technology.”380 Brzezinski goes on to state, “After it became clear that Pakistan was in 
the process of developing a nuclear weapons capability, we implemented the requirements of the 
Glenn amendment and quietly terminated aid.  Realizing that the amount of this assistance was 
too small to give us real leverage, we tried to orchestrate a diplomatic campaign against 
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Pakistan’s nuclear policy.”381   Pakistan did not directly violate the Glenn Amendment since 
there was no active nuclear weapons facility to inspect, but the U.S. government still utilized the 
Amendment in order to try and limit Pakistan’s ambitions. 
 Under Secretary of State David Newsom and Pakistan’s Secretary General for Foreign 
Affairs, Agha Shahi, discussed the possibility of the United States resuming aid to Pakistan in 
August 1978.382  However, there were several political problems with resuming aid, especially 
with the unresolved reprocessing issue.383  In the meeting, Shahi claimed that Pakistan was 
surprised by Ambassador Hummel’s departure from the conventional standards and felt that 
United States was going beyond the Glenn Amendment by making demands that no country 
would accept. Shahi stated that he would report Newsom’s remarks to General Zia and added 
that Pakistan would not inform the United States of any disruption in the status of the 
reprocessing plant.   
 Shahi went on to chastise the United States for not assisting Pakistan like the rest of the 
world. Christopher revealed, “Shahi asserted that the U.S. alone among creditor nations had been 
quote ‘odd man out’ unquote.  It was pointed out to Shahi that our decision on debt rescheduling 
was made on economic grounds and was related to Pakistan’s unexpectedly high level of 
remittances.”384 Newsom explained that the United States was not trying to penalize Pakistan or 
force it to admit shortcomings, but it was trying to find a way to normalize relations.385  Pakistan 
not only had to deal with the legal restrictions of the Glenn Amendment, but also a skeptical 
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political climate in Congress.  The legal reality was the Glenn Amendment that referred to the 
transfer of reprocessing technology and equipment to a country from outside the already 
established nuclear nations. Christopher reported, “The Glenn amendment would be triggered by 
such transfers to Pakistan and it was in anticipation of the Glenn amendment being activated that 
certain decisions were taken in Washington last year.”386 
 The Carter administration’s suspension of economic and military assistance to Pakistan 
was an “effort to persuade Islamabad to cancel plans to purchase the plant” and the U.S. stated 
that it would not begin the process of renewing aid until the reprocessing situation had been 
resolved.387  At this time, the U.S. government had no interest in publicizing Pakistan’s 
reprocessing situation or the growth of the Glenn amendment to cover more proliferation. Vance 
recalls, “Shahi stated flatly and repeatedly that no government of Pakistan could give even a 
private assurance not to engage in reprocessing and still survive in the face of public opinion.  
Unfortunately, if the United States could not offer aid and the extension of aid did not achieve 
the expected result, it had no leverage with Pakistan.” 
 By late 1978, the United States informed the International Atomic Energy Agency of the 
developments and diplomatic exchanges with Pakistan regarding the atomic bomb.   IAEA 
officials were shocked by the extent of Pakistan’s ambitions.  The IAEA director, Sigvard 
Eklund, had signed a letter to Pakistan stating that the IAEA had to be informed of the design, 
construction and/or operation of any reprocessing plant.388 When the French visited Pakistan in 
1978 to check on the progress of civil structures under the original contract that were not nuclear 
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related, the Pakistanis denied them access to certain parts of the plant, and they saw laboratories 
that were equipped with heavy shielding for plutonium oxide.  There was also information that 
Pakistan attempted to contact a German weapons producers in order to get more processing 
equipment.389 The IAEA grew increasingly concerned about the information coming from 
Pakistan.390    
 The IAEA sent several questions to Pakistan.  In response, Pakistan claimed that they did 
not need inspections because there was no facility that required safeguards.  In the IAEA 
briefing, “In musing over the seriousness of the situation and the limited tolerance of the world 
to accept such developments, Eklund wondered whether public disclosure would not be 
appropriate at some point.  Smith indicated that it might be effective in the future but for now he 
reminded Eklund of the sensitivity and care with which we must continue to deal with the 
issue.”391 Eklund believed that a nuclear free South Asian zone suggested by Ambassador Smith 
would not be feasible because China’s and India’s attitudes and the atomic weapons they held.392 
 Eklund’s conclusion was that the information on Pakistan should announced to the rest of 
the world so responsible parties could put pressures on Pakistan in order to limit its goals.393  In 
telegram regarding the conversation between Ambassador Smith and Dr. Eklund, “Ambassador 
Smith noted that he felt we still had some time, as he doubted the Pakistanis would be able to 
explode a device for two to three years.” 394 Eklund stated that the more time Pakistan had to 
work on a weapon design the harder it would be to stop their efforts, and Eklund wanted to 
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support whatever decision the United States made.  The telegram went on to state, “Eklund was 
clearly shocked and upset by this information.  He sees a Pakistan explosive capability as a 
serious threat to nuclear power programs of the future.”  When the United States finally included 
the IAEA in its feelings regarding Pakistan, the United States had full international support.    
 Pakistan’s quest for an atomic weapon sent the international community scrambling to try 
and contain the South Asian country.  For most of 1978, the United States moved to force the 
cancellation of France’s deal with Pakistan and then sent a letter to all of the United States 
nuclear allies to try and stop any exporting of nuclear material.  The United States also 
terminated any aid to Pakistan.  However, despite its efforts the Carter administration had little 
success in stopping Pakistan’s nuclear program.   
 The developments of the 1970s showed the international community that Jimmy Carter 
talked tough on nuclear proliferation, but if the country benefited the United States then nuclear 
ambitions could be overlooked.  The coup d’état committed by Muhammad Zia further 
destabilized Pakistan and increased U.S. concerns with Pakistan’s attempt to acquire an atomic 
weapon.  The reprocessing deal with France further increased tensions in the international 
community as the United States tried to influence its allies to avoid the sale of any nuclear 
materials to Pakistan. Carter did succeed in slowing down Pakistan’s quest for an atomic 
weapon, but he not succeed in dissuading Pakistan from its nuclear ambitions.  
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Conclusion  
 After decades of resisting international pressure, Pakistan rejoiced on May 28, 1998 as it 
successfully tested its first atomic device.395  A country that spent most of its recent history as a 
colony of the British Empire entered the nuclear age.    The United States and the international 
community saw the test as a demonstration of years of failed policies towards limiting the 
inevitable.  Pakistan had become the first Muslim country with an atomic weapon in its military 
arsenal.396  In 1978, President Jimmy Carter attempted to halt Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, but 
his efforts had only a limited effect and were unrealistic given Pakistan’s religious motivations.  
Pakistan’s enthusiasm for the project was not solely based on increasing military prowess or the 
country’s prestige around the world, but it was to acquire a nuclear weapon for the Muslim 
faith.397 While the financial pressures on Pakistan did have some success in limiting the speed of 
growth, Carter failed to fully understand the determination of the Pakistani government to 
acquire an atomic weapon and thus failed in his quest to end the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.   
 Throughout 1978, the United States continued to hold diplomatic discussions with 
Pakistan, but problems developed as crises in the Middle East and South Asia escalated. In an 
attempt to halt the development of atomic weapons, in 1979 the United States decided to suspend 
aid again in hopes of changing Pakistan’s course.  In a letter to French President Giscard and 
other international leaders, Carter stated, “I am very concerned about the mounting evidence that 
the Pakistani nuclear program is aimed at developing a nuclear weapons option.  There is very 
good evidence that the Pakistanis have a well-financed, highly secret program to build a gas 
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centrifuge enrichment plant, and that they are continuing efforts at the reprocessing capability as 
well.”398  After a brief suspension, Pakistani President Zia successfully lobbied the United States 
for the resumption of aid in early 1980.  The situation with Afghanistan specifically moved the 
United States towards rebuilding its relationship with Pakistan since the Soviet Union became 
the greater enemy.399  In late 1979, Carter attempted to mend relations and offered Zia $400 
million dollars in aid.  Zia turned down Carter’s aid package and called the deal “peanuts” to the 
international community.400  President Ronald Reagan later offered Pakistan a larger deal of $3.2 
billion and forty F-16 fighters.401  This increase in the deal largely came from the U.S. reliance 
on Pakistan to support the Afghanistan rebellion against the Soviet invasion and Reagan’s more 
aggressive approach to foreign policy.402  The deal was not an incentive for Pakistan to stop its 
atomic program nor did the deal request that it halt its nuclear program.  The fear of Soviet 
aggression outweighed any threat of a nuclear Pakistan, and it continued to work towards an 
atomic weapon.   
 General Zia continued work on a nuclear devise until his death in 1988 and put control 
over the program exclusively under the military.403  Scott Sagan explains, “It is therefore not 
surprising that common military biases can be seen to have influenced Pakistani crisis behavior, 
its development of its nuclear arsenal, and the doctrine that guides the potential use of nuclear 
weapons in war." Sagan continues, "the Pakistani military has maintained virtually complete and 
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independent control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, shunning the input of civilian leaders.”404 
After Zia’s death in 1988, the next elected civilian leader Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of former 
prime minister, received the first brief on Pakistan’s atomic weapons programs from the United 
States and not from the military.405  There has not been an official confirmation on when 
Pakistan finally completed its first atomic weapon, but it was largely rumored that Pakistan had 
completed the weapon several years before the test.406  
 The quest for a Pakistani nuclear weapon was an important factor in Carter’s desire to 
limit the proliferation of atomic weapons, but Carter’s inconsistent dealings with Pakistan by 
trying to utilize economic aid and sanctions limited its effectiveness.  The reprocessing plant deal 
between France and Pakistan caused international tension and the United States used the 
situation to justify the suspension of aid to Pakistan in 1977 and again in 1979, but the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan changed the situation.407 Curbing Soviet aggression became a top 
priority and as the neighbor to Afghanistan, Pakistan became the primary means for funneling 
supplies into the embattled country.408  Carter campaigned on the promise of human rights and 
ending nuclear proliferation around the world; however, his resumption of aid to Pakistan proves 
that the policy ideas were short lived and that the Cold War conflict truly drove American 
foreign policy. 
 Carter also failed to fully account for the religious motivations in Pakistan’s quest for an 
atomic device.  Pakistani leaders Bhutto and Zia both made aggressive proclamations regarding 
an atomic bomb for Pakistan and thus the Islamic world.  He famously stated that Pakistan would 
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“eat grass” before it would give up its atomic dreams.409 Bhutto also proclaimed that if all other 
religious groups had an atomic weapon the Muslim world should as well.410  While the growth of 
extreme Islam was relatively new to Carter and his administration, the words of Pakistan’s 
leaders showed that their quest for atomic weapons would come at the cost of the people.411  
Thus making Carter’s non-proliferation initiative and economic restrictions on Pakistan mostly 
useless. 
 As Carter had to change his policy in order to respond to aggressive Soviet actions, 
Carter’s national security team became fractured.  His spokes-in-the-wheels approach 
deteriorated as his top two top foreign policy advisors began to fight for time with him.  
Eventually, Vance left the White House after increasing tensions regarding moral differences 
with Brzezinski and the president regarding the Iranian Hostage crisis.412  The administration 
held a crucial meeting while Vance was on vacation, effectively minimalizing him from 
significant policy decisions and directly led to his decision to resign from the Department of 
State.413  The resignation of Vance sounded the alarm of a disjointed administration and led to 
questions about Carter’s ability to be re-elected in 1980.414   
 Carter’s belief in ending proliferation helped guide many of his policies, but the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan changed the course of his administration.415  To the American people, 
limiting the expansion of atomic weapons no longer seemed like a viable option.416  Soon Carter 
began actively expanding the military, something strictly contradictory to his previous campaign 
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promises and administration’s policies.  The growth of the armed forces continued into the 
Reagan administration, along with U.S. military aid to Pakistan for its covert support of the 
Afghan Mujahedeen.417  
 President Jimmy Carter had attempted to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons around 
the world, but on his watch Pakistan set course towards what he desperately wanted to stop. Most 
likely there was nothing that could be done to stop Pakistan’s from obtaining nuclear technology 
and materials, but Carter failed to dissuade the country from even considering a change in its 
program.  Any other course of action taken by Carter towards Pakistan could have been 
disastrous, particularly a military intervention; so, the administration had limited options.  
However, had Carter been willing to stay the course on his policies it could have set a precedent 
for policy in the future.  Carter showed Pakistan that as long as the country served a purpose to 
the United States, it would get a slide on sensitive issues and set the foundation for diplomatic 
relations.     
 Carter began his presidency with a variety of hopes and aspirations that were soon dashed 
by an unstable world.  He wished to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but he failed to 
move Pakistan towards the nuclear free world that he envisioned. As the Middle East situation 
grew grimmer between in 1979 and 1980, Carter lost any leverage he had in dissuading Pakistan 
from developing atomic weapons. A nuclear free world is a wonderful vision, but the reality of 
ancient rivalries and underdog ambitions limited his ability to manipulate a determined Pakistan.   
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